05000412/LER-2006-002, Regarding Entry Into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of Both Trains of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System
| ML061650294 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/12/2006 |
| From: | Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-06-096 LER 06-002-00 | |
| Download: ML061650294 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
| 4122006002R00 - NRC Website | |
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FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company James H. Lash Site Vice President 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 June 12, 2006 L-06-096 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 License No. NPF-73 LER 2006-002-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 The following Licensee Event Report is submitted:
LER 2006-002-00, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), "Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of Both Trains of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System."
H. Lash Attachment c:
Mr. T. G. Colburn, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. P. C. Cataldo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator INPO Records Center (via electronic image)
Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)
Abstract
On April 11, 2006, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 declared both trains of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) inoperable due to a loss of filtering capacity of the charcoal main filter banks. The charcoal main filter banks were sprayed with water after an inadvertent actuation of fire protection deluge valves. With the charcoal main filter banks wet, their filtering capacity was diminished and both trains were declared inoperable. At 0924 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.51582e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered the actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. In accordance with the requirements of TS 3.0.3, actions to prepare for a plant shutdown began at 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br /> and a shutdown of the plant was commenced at 1055 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.014275e-4 months <br />.
In parallel with the plant shutdown, a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was prepared for presentation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). At 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br />, with reactor power at approximately 19 percent
(%), the NOED was granted by the NRC for a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the plant shutdown was terminated. The unit returned to 100% power on April 12, 2006, at 1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br />.
The most probable cause of the event was a ground that actuated certain fire protection actuation relays.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to an entry into TS 3.0.3 for greater than one hour, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system designed to control the release of radioactive material, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) as an event where a single cause resulted in the loss of two independent trains of SLCRS as required by TS 3.7.8.1. The plant risk associated with the inadvertent actuation of the fire protection deluge system is considered to be very low.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
T4'RC F6RM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-20oo)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE I
SEOUENTAL I REVISION Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 2 05000412 2 ofr5 2006 002 00
- 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Immediate actions included isolating water to the deluge systems for the areas involved as well as the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps as a precautionary measure. Hourly fire tours were initiated to the isolated areas as a compensatory measure.
- 2. The charcoal and High Efficiency Particle Air (HEPA) filters on the main filter banks were replaced as necessary.
- 3. The deluge valves for the SLCRS main filter banks are planned to be replaced with manually operated ball valves. Actuation of the fire protection system to these areas will be manually controlled.
- 4. An investigation will be performed to determine if a latent common connection exists between the non-safety related 125 VDC 2-5 and 2-6 buses.
Completion of the above and other corrective actions are being tracked through the BVPS corrective action program.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review found one prior BVPS Unit 1/ BVPS Unit 2 Licensee Event Report within the last ten years involving the potential for a spurious actuation of the fire protection deluge system that could result in both trains of SLCRS being inoperable at Unit 1 or Unit 2.
LER 1-97-021-01 "Potential for Seismic Event to Result in Both Trains of Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System to Become Inoperable". This LER addressed the potential for a spurious actuation of the deluge system during a seismic event due to the use of non-qualified relays in the fire protection control circuitry. The corrective actions involved the qualification and/or replacement of the relays to meet seismic criteria.
COMMITMENTS
There are no new commitments made by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for BVPS Unit No. 2 in this document.