05000409/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Forwards LER 82-015/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

ML20054H684
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	06/17/1982
From:	Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20054H685	List: 05000409/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted 05000409/LER-1982-015-01, /01T-0:on 820616,both HPCS Pumps Placed in Pullout & LPCS Valve Control Switch Turned to Close to Prevent Challenging of Eccs.Caused by Shift Supervisor Not Cognizant of Work Scope Involved W/Change
References
LAC-8353, NUDOCS 8206240328
Download: ML20054H684 (2)

LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Event date:
Report date:
4091982015R00 - NRC Website

text

T d DAmYLAND COOPERAT/VE

• PO BOX 817

• 2615 EAST AV SOUTH

• LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788 4 000 June 17, 1982 In reply, please refer to LAC-8353 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-45 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 82-15

REFERENCES:

(1) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.f.

(2) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.2.2.15.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In accordance with Reference 1, this is to inform you of a personnel error /

procedural inadequacy which could have prevented, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of a system used to cope with accidents analyzed in the Safeguards Report for Operating Authorization, which occurred, when the plant was in a cold shutdown condition.

Reference 2 specifies in part:

Both core spray pumpe ring be removed from service for naintenance provided that att control rode are futty inserted, the reactor pressure is at atmospheric, the " Control Pover" key evitch is in the "0FF" position and the too pressure core spray subsystem is operable.

At 0808 on June 16, 1982 the control switches for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) pumps were placed in " PULLOUT" and the low pressure core spray (LPCS) valve control switch was turned to "CLOSE" in preparation for changing the transmitter for Water Level Safety Channel No. 2 to an NRC-required environmentally qualified transmitter. The Shift Supervisor directed these actions to be taken to prevent unnecessary challenging of a safety system due to generation of a low water level signal during the modification work. He conservatively believed that power to the Water Level Safety Channel No. 2

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Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator June 17, 1982 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LAC-8353 safety drawer would be disconnected, which would cause the channel output to fail low, generating a low water level signal. However, power was disconnected to the transmitter only and the safety drawer was placed in the

" TEST" position, which generated a normal " water level" signal. Therefore, the placing of the HPCS Pumps to " PULLOUT" and the LPCS Valve to "CLOSE" was not necessary. Backup water level indication was provided by Water Level Channels 1 and 3.

At approximately 0900 on June 16, the NRC Resident Inspector questioned the positioning of the control switches for the HPCS pumps and LPCS valve.

Investigation determined the control switch positioning was not necessary for the work being accomplished at that time. At 0908, the LPCS Valve control switch was returned to the "AUT0" position, thereby satisfying the requirement of Reference 2.

At 0915, the control switches for the HPCS Pumps were also re'u: aed to " AUT0".

At no time while the control switches for the HPCS Pumps were in " PULLOUT" and the LPCS valve control switch was in " CLOSED", was emergency core cooling needed. No evolutions were in progress which had a potential for affecting reactor water level.

A better method of ensuring that the duty Shift Supervisors are cognizant of the scope of the work being performed on facility changes will be instituted.

The calibration procedure for the Water Level Safety Channels has been revised to specify what actions need to be taken to prevent inadvertant actuation and challenging of safety systems during calibration. These actions should help prevent reoccurrence of a similar event.

Prompt notification of this event was made by L. S. Goodman, LACBWR Operations Engineer, to L. A. Reyes, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, at 1455 on June 16, 1982.

A Licensee Event Report (Reference: Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4) is enclosed.

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE

.A,tP_

Frank Linder, General Ma ger FL:LSG:eme Enclosures cc: Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector INP0 WP-6