05000409/LER-1982-013, Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

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Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20054M414
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 07/01/1982
From: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20054M415 List:
References
LAC-8375, NUDOCS 8207130164
Download: ML20054M414 (4)
v • d • e


LER-1982-013, Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
Event date:
Report date:
4091982013R00 - NRC Website
v • d • e

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DlDA/RYLAND h

[k COOPERAT/VE

  • P.O BOX 817
  • 2615 EAST AV SOUTH
  • LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788-4000 July 1,1982 In reply, please refer to LAC-8375 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE B0ILING WATER REACTOR (LAC 8WR)

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE N0. 82-13

REFERENCES:

(1) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b.

(2) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.2.2.2.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In accordance with Reference 1, this is to inform you of entry into a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation while the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition.

Reference 2 requires that the reactor coolant conductivity be a maximum of 5 micrombos/cm and that the chloride concentration not exceed 0.1 ppm.

Reference 2 does permit those limits to be exceeded for periods of no longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, provided the maximum chloride concentration does not exceed 1.0 ppm.

At 0615 on June 3,1982, with the reactor in cold shutdown, the reactor coolant conductivity exceeded 5 micrombos/cm by Control Room chart indication.

A primary water sample was taken at 0630. Analysis determined the conductivity to be 17.35 micromhos/cm and the chloride concentration to be 0.12 ppm.

A feed and bleed evolution was initiated. Water from the Overhead Storage Tank (0HST) was sent to the reactor vessel and primary water was rejected to the OHST through the Primary Purification System.

Primary water samples were taken with the following results:

8207130164 820701 PDR ADOCK 05000409 5

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WP-6.5 9

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator July 1, 1982 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LAC-8375 SAMPLE TIME CONDUCTIVITY CHLORIDES 0050,06/03/82 0.47 micromhos/cm (0.02 ppm 0632,06/03/82 17.35 micrombos/cm 0.12 ppm 0758, 06/03/82 15.41 micrombos/cm 0.082 ppm 0903, 06/03/82 11.1 micrombos/cm (0.05 ppm 1058, 06/03/82 8.02 micrombos/cm

<0.05 ppm 1525, 06/03/82 8.23 micrombos/cm (0.05 ppm 2210,06/03/82 1.00 micromhos/cm

<0.05 ppm 0100,06/04/82 0.99 micrombos/cm (0.05 ppm As these results show, the reactor coolant chloride concentration was within the limit less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the conductivity increase and conductivity decreased below the limit within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

The cause of the high conductivity and chloride concentration was performance of a surveillance test, " Test of Emergency Core Spray Check Valves, low Pressure, and HPSW Isolation Valves." One of the items checked in this surveillance -test is flow through the High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) Check Valve 53-26-004 (see attached drawing).

HPSW, which uses river water, is a backup emergency water supply to the High Pressure Core Spray System. The line is normally stagnant, with river water on the upstream side of Valve 53-25-004, " Service Water to Emergency Core Spray Pumps." Earlier in the refueling outage, river water would have entered the horizontal stretch of the line downstream of 53-25-004 when the valve was cycled during post-maintenance testing after replacement of its solenoid valve with an Environmentally Qualified solenoid.

That testing was done with the manual isolation valves 53-24-007 and 53-24-008 closed, but after the test when valve 53-24-008 was returned to the locked open position, the approximately five gallons of river water between it and 53-25-004 entered the line.

The river water would not have entered the reactor at that time because the piping rises between 53-24-008 and the check valve 53-26-004. During the surveillance of HPSW Check Valve 53-26-004, demineralized water is connected to the HPSW Tell-Tale Drain 53-23-002. The Demineralized Water System pressure sends the water in the piping through the check valve and the Low Pressure Emergency Core Spray Valve 53-25-001, which is briefly opened, into the reactor.

The stagnant river water which had been in the piping prior to June 3, was thus sent into the reactor vessel, raising the primary coolant conductivity and chloride concentration until the Primary Purification removed the impurities.

A request for eliminating testing of the HPSW Check Valve will be submitted or the system will be modified to preclude river water from entering the reactor during testing.

This test was first conducted in 1980 as part of the Pump and Valve Inservice Inspection Program.

WP-6.5 Mr. James G. K+ppler, R:gional Administrator July 1, 1982 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LAC-8375 A Licensee Event Report (Reference: Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4) is enclosed.

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, l

DAIRYLAND POW R COOPERATIVE As~'

w Frank Linder, General Manager FL:LSG:eme Enclosures cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 INP0 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1820 Water Place Atlanta, GA 30339 f

NRC Resident Inspector l

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