05000400/FIN-2009006-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Unresolved Item Associated with the Evaluation of the Failure of Emergency Service Water Valve Failure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a URI associated with the evaluation of the failure of ESW Auxiliary Reservoir Discharge Valve 271 to open on the start of ESW Pump B. Description. On October 19, 2007, while in Mode 5, ESW Auxiliary Reservoir Discharge Valve 271 failed to open on the start of ESW Pump B. This valve is required to open on the start of an ESW pump to provide a discharge path for the cooling water. Operators immediately stopped ESW Pump B and aligned normal service water to the safety related components in Train B. The licensee determined that the auto open controls for Valve SW-271 had been disabled by a clearance order for unrelated work. Although ESW Train B is not required to be operational in Mode 5, the components cooled by ESW Train B, such as EDG B and RHR Train B, were being relied upon as protected train equipment. Therefore, ESW Train B was necessary to ensure core decay heat removal in the event that off-site power was not available. NRC inspectors wrote a self-revealing NCV of TS 6.8.1, Programs and Procedures, for an inadequate clearance order as documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000400/2007005. The team reviewed the evaluation performed for this NCV including the reportability review. The reportability review stated this condition was not reportable since operators were able to open this valve manually from the control room. The team questioned whether the operators would be able to open the valve within one minute, which is required to ensure cooling to the EDGs during an accident. The team also determined that when the valve is manually opened by the reactor operators from the control room, that the valve would automatically go closed due to the inadequate clearance. As a result of the teams questions, the licensee wrote NCR 358062 and determined that the failure of SW-271 to open was a MRFF. This failure did not exceed the ESW Train B maintenance rule performance criteria. The licensee determined that this failure affected the MSPI. This condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of EDG B and RHR B that are needed to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition or to remove residual heat. The licensee wrote NCR 361821 to address this issue. This issue is considered unresolved pending additional NRC review of the evaluation of the failure including the reportability review, the risk assessment, and the corrective actions: URI 05000400/2009006-03, Unresolved Item Associated with the Evaluation of the Failure of Emergency Service Water Valve 271 |
| Site: | Harris  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000400/2009006 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Forbes J Austin M Bates P Lessard R Chou R Musser W Looa Nielsenj Austin L Miller R Musser P Lessard J Beaversr Taylord Merzke P Niebaum M Catts P Lessard E Stamm |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Harris - IR 05000400/2009006 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Harris) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Harris)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||