05000395/LER-2016-003, Regarding Steam Propagation Door Discovered Propped Open

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Regarding Steam Propagation Door Discovered Propped Open
ML16319A400
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 11/14/2016
From: Lippard G
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
818.07, CR-16-04703, RC-16-0157 LER 16-003-00
Download: ML16319A400 (5)


LER-2016-003, Regarding Steam Propagation Door Discovered Propped Open
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
3952016003R00 - NRC Website

text

George A. Lippard Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4810 November 14, 2016 A SCANA COMPANY Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir / Madam:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS), UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER 2016-003-00)

STEAM PROPAGATION DOOR DISCOVERED PROPPED OPEN Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2016-003-00, for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). This report describes a condition and preliminary results from an event, discovered during routine operator rounds, where a steam propagation door to the 'C' Safety Related Chiller Room (DRIB/107) was discovered propped open without all required compensatory actions. The propped open door could have rendered both trains of Chilled Water nonfunctional if a High Energy Line Break (HELB) event occurred. This could have subsequently rendered both trains of High Head Safety Injection inoperable due to the loss of chilled water cooling to safety related room coolers. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and will be supplemented when results are finalized.

Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Bruce Thompson at (803) 931-5042.

Very truly yours, JMG/GAL/ts Attachment c:

K. B. Marsh S. A. Byrne J. B. Archie N. S. Cams J. H. Hamilton S. M. Shealy W. M. Cherry C. Haney S. A. Williams George A. Lippard NRC Resident Inspector L. W. Harris Paulette Ledbetter J. C. Mellette ICES Coordinator K. M. Sutton INPO Records Center Marsh USA, Inc.

PRSF (RC-16-0157)

Maintenance Rule Engineer NSRC RTS (CR-16-04703)

File (818.07)

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station

  • P. 0. Box 88
  • Jenkinsville, SC
  • 29065
  • F (803) 941-9776

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) 1 OF

3. PAGE 05000
4. TITLE
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

FACILITY NAME 05000 DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY NAME 05000 DOCKET NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE
10. POWER LEVEL
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE YEAR DAY MONTH ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)

YEAR YEAR DAY MONTH 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5)

OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in Page of 05000-

3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

3.0 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The safety significance of this event will be provided in a supplemental report to this LER.

4.0 PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE No previous occurrence within the last three years.

5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The door was closed as the immediate action. The station issued Special Order 16-05 as an interim action to suspend propping open chiller room doors. The station initiated a preliminary assessment of the potential impacts due to steam propagation. The station conducted a walkdown of the steam barriers associated with the event. A detailed analysis will be completed to address the safety significance. Procedures will be reviewed for enhancement to minimize reassurance.

4 4

VC SUMMER - UNIT 1 395 2016 003 00