05000395/LER-2001-002

LER-2001-002,

Docket Number
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3952001002R00 - NRC Website

PLANT IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION

N/A — Technical Specification 3.0.4

IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT

On 2/22/01, a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) cross calibration for the Reactor Protection System was in progress during the Virgil C. Summer Station (VCSNS) plant start-up. Plant instrumentation and control procedure ICP-340.048 directs all narrow range RTDs to be disconnected from their associated instrument channels to perform RTD cross calibration. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were closed. The plant had proceeded from Mode 4 to Mode 3 during the calibration process. SCE&G Operations realized that Technical Specifications (TS) Table 3.3-3, Item 9.b, should have prevented entering Mode 3.

Table 3.3-3 item 9.b is the P-12 interlock, and its action statement 20 requires verification that the interlock is in its proper condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, which could be done, and was done. However since T.S. 3.0.4 applies, the plant should never have entered Mode 3 with this instrumentation out of service.

EVENT DATE

2/22/01

REPORT DATE

4/20/01 The event is documented in the VCSNS Corrective Action Program under Condition Evaluation Report CER 01-0262.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Mode 4 (0% Power)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 2/22/01, a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) cross calibration for the Reactor Protection System was in progress during plant start-up. Plant instrumentation and control procedure ICP-340.048 directs all narrow range RTDs to be disconnected from their associated instrument channels to perform RTD cross calibration. The MSIVs were closed.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) V. C. Summer Nuclear Station 05000395 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Cont'd) copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 4 to Mode 3 during the calibration process. SCE&G Operations realized 3.3-3, Item 9.b, should have prevented entering Mode 3.

and its action statement 20 requires verification that the interlock is could be done, and was done. However since T.S. 3.0.4 applies, Mode 3 with this instrumentation out of service.

that we were in T.S. 3.0.3. Per Action 20 of Table 3.3-3, item the plant did not have to apply 3.0.3 because the interlocks were in the (Tave was still less than 552 Degrees F). However, since 3.0.4 3 should have been delayed until P-12 was determined to be all 3 loops of Tave were in TEST per the applicable l&C procedure.

(R&R) order, 01-0078 was written as a Mode 2 restraint requiring Tave Isolation Valves closed. The cross-calibration work was allowed to were successfully completed and the R&R was cleared.

inadequate administrative control of operational restrictions within plant loops of narrow range RTDs in "Test". TS Table 3.3-3, Item 9.b, a TS 3.0.4 exclusion for entry into an operational mode while to get a valid cross-calibration of the RTDs. This is standard reliable results. Action 20, which deals specifically with P-12, was provided the bistable was in the correct state for the plant P-12 function is guaranteed because the bistables are placed in a trip put the plant in a safer state, as the P-12 function does not require Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants, includes a note MSIVs are closed. During the event, the MSIVs were closed.

The plant had proceeded from Mode that Technical Specifications (TS) Table Table 3.3-3 item 9.b is the P-12 interlock, in its proper condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, which the plant should never have entered At 2245 2/22/01 the Shift Supervisor declared 9.b for Low-Low Tave, P-12 Interlock, required state for the existing plant condition does apply to Action 20, entry into Mode operable. This was not possible since On 2/23/01, Removal and Restoration continue. At 1645 on 2/23/01, the calibrations

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is attributed to modes.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The plant entered Mode 3 with all three Action 20 (P-12 Interlock) does not have depending on the Action statement.

All three loops need to be tested simultaneously industry practice, and provides the most met with one or all channels of P-12 inoperable condition. With all loops in "Test", the condition per the procedure. This actually bistable or logic states to change.

Additionally, NUREG-1431, Standardized that this function is not required if the

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

ICP-340.048 will be changed to assure that mode change restrictions (TS 3.0.4) are adhered to during surveillance testing.

Submit a TS change to align with the guidance of NUREG-1431 for actions associated with Table 3.3-3.

These actions will be completed prior to VCSNS Refueling Outage 13, currently scheduled for Spring 2002.

PRIOR OCCURRENCES

None