05000387/LER-2016-006, Regarding Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Damper Controller Sticking

Regarding Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Damper Controller Sticking

ML16323A007
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	11/17/2016
From:	Franssen R Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-7548 LER 16-006-00
Download: ML16323A007 (4)

LER-2016-006, Regarding Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Damper Controller Sticking

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3872016006R00 - NRC Website

text

NOV I 7 2016 Robert J. Franssen Plant Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3170 Fax570.542.1504 robert.franssen@talenenergy.com SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388(387)/2016-006-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF -22 PLA-7548 TALEN~

ENERGY 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-387 50-388 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-388(387)/2016-006-00. The LER reports an event involving loss of secondary containment differential pressure due to a stuck exhaust damper. This event was dete1mined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

R. J. Franssen Attachment: LER 50-3 88(3 87)/20 16-006-00 Copy:

NRC Region I Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandalol)l collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industl)l.

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Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulalol)l Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail

'!\\"...... * <i" to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatol)l (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Alfairs, NEOB-10202, (3150*0104), Office of Managemenl and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control httQ:IIWNW. n rc.govlreading-rmldoc-collectionslnur~slstafflsr1022/r31) number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

~ - DOCKET NUMBER

13. PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 05000388 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Damper Controller Sticking

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 I \\ Itt FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 22 2016 2016 006 00 2016 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check all that apply) 1 D 2o.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 2o.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

[8J 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER ICENSEE CONTACT rELEPHONE NUMBER {Include Area Code)

C. E. Manges, Jr., Senior Engineer-Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (570) 542-3089 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX E

VA Bushing Contromatics Yes

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

~NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limft to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On September 22, 2016 at 03:20, a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) reported that Reactor Building Zone II differential pressure (dP) was steady at 0.15 inches water gauge (WG) resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1. Operations determined that the flow control damper (PDD27522A) for the "A" Zone II equipment exhaust fan (2V206A) was sticking, resulting in Zone II dP not being properly controlled. The linkage for the damper was agitated and the damper moved to control dP as designed. Operations placed the "B" division fan (2V206B) in service. Following the fan swap, dP held steady at 0.31 inches WG with 2V206B in service and 2V206A in standby. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 03:42.

This event was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (EN 52255). The condition also requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

The cause of the event was age related degradation of the brass bushing and grease hardening in the damper linkage. Corrective actions include initiating work orders to disassemble, inspect, and replace the brass bushings for the remaining similar dampers. A Preventive Maintenance strategy will be evaluated following completion of the inspections of the remaining dampers.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit 1 - Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 - Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

EVENT DESCRIPTION

YEAR I

SEQUENTIAL I

REV NUMBER NO.

2016

- 006

- 00 On September 22, 2016 at 03:20, a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) reported that Reactor Building Zone II differential pressure (dP) was steady at 0.15 inches water gauge (WG) resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1. Operations determined that the flow control damper (PDD27522A) [EllS System/Component Identifier: VAIDMP] for the "A" Zone II equipment exhaust fan (2V206A) [EllS System/Component Identifier: VA/FAN] was sticking, resulting in Zone II dP not being properly controlled.

The linkage for the damper was agitated and the damper moved to control dP as designed. Operations placed the "B" division fan (2V206B) in service. Following the fan swap, dP held steady at 0.31 inches WG with 2V206B in service and 2V206A in standby. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 03:42.

During troubleshooting for this event, the linkage was disassembled and the damper was manually stroked with the linkage arm. The damper stroked smoothly with no binding. Internal inspection identified no issues. The pivot point for the linkage arm was disassembled and replaced. When the pivot point was disassembled, Maintenance discovered that the brass bushing and pins were worn and the grease was hardened and sticky.

This event was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function (EN 52255). The condition also requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was age related degradation of the brass bushing and grease hardening.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

An engineering evaluation was performed and concluded that secondary containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the accident analysis and also of re-establishing 0.25 inches vacuum (drawdown) within the assumed accident analysis time (1 0 minutes). Therefore, the subject event did not cause a loss of safety function. This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the engineering analysis that shows there was no loss of ability to fulfill the safety function. Page 2 of 3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06*2016)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www. nrc.gov/readi nq-rm/doc-collections/nu reqs/staff/sr1 022/r3/)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555*0001, or by e*mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITYNAME

2. DOCKET NUMBER

3. LER NUMBER Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

05000-388 Key corrective actions include the following:

YEAR I

2016 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

- 006 I

1. Work orders were written to disassemble, inspect, and replace the brass bushings for the remaining similar dampers (PDD27522B, PDD17522A/B, PDD17512A/B, and PDD27512A/B).

REV NO.

- 00

2. A PM strategy will be evaluated following completion of the inspections of the remaining similar dampers. Industry benchmarking revealed that no other stations perform PMs on these damper linkage arms, and the failure history at Susquehanna is small I minimal.

COMPONENT FAILURE INFORMATION

Information on the failed bushing is as follows:

Manufacturer: Contromatics Model #: 375SR

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 50-387(388) I 2016-012-00, "Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Loss of Differential Pressure as a Result of Solenoid Failure," dated May 26, 2016 LER 50-387(388) I 2016-003-00, "U2 Zone 3 HVAC Unable to Maintain Zone 3 Differential Pressure Greater than 0.25 in wg," dated May 6, 2016 LER 50-387 I 2015-013-01, "Loss of Differential Pressure in Zone I of Secondary Containment Due to Solenoid Valve Failure," dated August 5, 2016 LER 50-388(387) I 2015-010-01, "Supplement Report to LER-2015-01 0-00, Loss of Differential Pressure in Zone II of Secondary Containment," dated July 6, 2016 LER 50-387(388) I 2015-002-00, "Secondary Containment lnoperability Due to Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1,"dated June 10, 2015 Page 3 of 3