05000364/LER-2010-001, Regarding Unplanned LOSP During SI with LOSP Testing
| ML101720122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/2010 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-10-1151 LER 10-001-00 | |
| Download: ML101720122 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3642010001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
J,R,Joilnson Southern Nuclear Vice f'msldpnt ~ Fmlev Operating Compllny, Inc.
Post DfJicE: Drawl)! 410 Ashford, Alabama 36312*0470
- 81 n" 814 *1511 FilX :3:14,01,14128 II) Sen't' Your 'Wh rlJ.",
June 17,2010 Docket No.:
50-364 Nl-1D-1151 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2010-001-00 Unplanned LOSP during SI with LOSP Testing Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73{a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Doug McKinney at {205}992-5982.
~~rf. I1L--
- J, R. JOhns7.,
Vice President - Farley JRJIW DO
Enclosure:
Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2010-001-00
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-1D-1151 Page 2 cc: §outhern Nuclear Ooerating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser. Executive Vice President Mr. J. R. Johnson, Vice President - Farley Ms. P. M. Marino. Vice President - Engineering RTYPE: CFA04.054 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes. Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Mr. P. Boyle, NRR Project Manager
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2010-001-00 Unplanned LOSP during Sf with LOSP Testing Enclosure Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 201~OO1*00
,..RCFORM366 U.S. NUClEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08131/2010 9-2007)
EsUmated burden per response 10 comply with this mandatory coIIaction raqueS1: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are ineorporated Inlo the licensing process and fed back to induS1ry. Send comments re(tard~ burden IIstlmalll to the Reeords and FOIAIPrivacy Service Branch
- - 5 F 2). U.S.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Nuclear ~Iory Commission. Washington. DC 20555'()ool, or ~intemet e*mail to I ollects.nrc~. and to \\he Desk OIIiellr. Offtce of I rmation and Regulatory Affails. NE
- - 10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an Information collection cIoes not display a eurranUy valid OMB control numbar, \\he NRC may not conduct or ~nsor, and a person is not requlrad to respond 10, the Information celiac on.
- 1. FACILITV NAME
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER
- 13. PAGE Joseph M Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 05000364 1 of 3
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMeER SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
05000 FACIlITYNMtE DOCKET NUMBER 04 30 2010 2010 - 001 -
00 06 17 2010 05000
~. OPERAnNG MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFRI: (Check aU /hat apply) o 2O.2201(b) o 2O.2203(a)(3)(i) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) o 5O.73(a)(2)(vii) 6 o 2O.2201(d) o 2O.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(vili)(A) o 2O.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 5O.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) o 5O.73(a)(2)(viii}(B) o 2O.2203(a)(2)(i) o 5O.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) o 5O.73(a)(2)(iiI) o 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL o 2O.2203(a)(2)(ii) o 5O.36(c)(1 )(iI)(A)
L8I 50.73{a)(2)(lv)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 2O.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 5O.36(c)(2) o SO.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71(a)(4) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) o 50.46(a)(3)(ii) o SO.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71 (a)(5) 000 o 2O.2203(a)(2)(v) o SO.73(a)(2)(i)(A) o SO.73(a)(2)(v)(C) o OTHER o 2O.2203(a)(2)(vi) o SO.73(a)(2)(i)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
~
rELEPHONE NUMBER (Indude Area Code)
J. R. Johnson - Vice President (334) 899-5156
- 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANU*
REPORTABLE MANU*
REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DYES (ff yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
L8I NO DATE
~BSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced ~wrttten lines)
On April 30, 2010 at 21:00, an unplanned loss of Off-Site Power (lOSP) on A-train 4160 volt emergency Bus 2F occurred during a scheduled outage test, Safety Injection (SI) with LOSP. The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2A was being shutdown following the actuation portion of the test. When the B2F Sequencer was reset, the EDG output breaker (DF08-2) unexpectedly opened to generate the lOSP Signal on the 2F Bus. As a result, the B2F Sequencer functioned to automatically re-close DF08-2, and start both the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump and 2A High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump. All systems functioned as designed for this condition and core cooling was maintained throughout by the B-train 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump. Unit 1 remained at 100 % power during the event.
A recent design change was implemented to assure EDG sequencer reliability during all moc:les of EDG operation. Subsequent to this design change, the necessary procedure change had not been properly incorporated in the test procedure. Test guidance relied upon transitioning to the System Operating Procedure (SOP) for operating the newly installed Test Trip Override Switch (TIOS) located on the B2F Sequencer. However, the transition was not at the correct location in the test procedure.
Once recognized. the SOP guidance was used and the B2F Sequencer TIOS was operated before resetting the sequencer; and the restoration section was completed without further complications.
NRC FOAM 3Il6 (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
3 NRC FORM 386A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
CONTINUATION SHEET
- 1. FACIUTYNAME
- 2. DOCKET e. LER NUMBER 1 PAGE SEQUENTIAL IREVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit* 2 05000364 I
2 of 2010 001 00 NARRAllVE (If TI'IOI'S space is required, US8 additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]
Description of Event
On April 30, 2010 at 21 :00, an unplanned Loss of Off-Site Power (LOSP) on A-train 4160 volt emergency Bus 2F [EB] occurred during a scheduled outage test, Safety Injection (SI) with LOSP. The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2A [EI<] was being shutdown following the actuation portion of the test. When the B2F Sequencer (A-train) was reset, the EDG output breaker (OF08-2) unexpectedly opened to generate the LOSP Signal on 4160 volt Bus 2F. As a result, the B2F Sequencer functioned to automatically re-close DF08-2 and start both the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW)
[BA] pump and 2A High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) [SO] pump. All systems functioned as designed for this condition, and core cooling was maintained throughout by the B-traln 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) [BP] pump. Flow to the reactor core was maintained. Unit 1 was not affected and remained at 100 % power during the event.
A recent design change was implemented to assure EOG sequencer reliability during all modes of EDG operation. Subsequent to this design change, the necessary procedure change had not been properly incorporated in the test procedure. Test guidance relied upon transitioning to the System Operating Procedure (SOP) for operating the newly installed Test Trip Override Switch (TTOS) located on the B2F Sequencer. However, the tranSition was not at the correct location in the test procedure. Once recognized, SOP procedure guidance was used and the B2F Sequencer nos was operated before resetting the sequencer, and the restoration section was completed without further complications.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater and emergency core cooling systems, an eight hour non-emergency report was issued on May 1, 2010 at 01 :01, Event Notification 45889.
Cause of Event
A recent design change was implemented to assure EDG sequencer reliability during all modes of EDG operation. Subsequent to this design change, the necessary procedure change had not been properly incorporated in the test procedure. Test guidance relied upon transitioning to the System Operating Procedure (SOP) for operating the newly installed Test Trip Override Switch (TIOS) located on the S2F Sequencer. However, the transition was not at the correct location in the test procedure.
Safety Assessment
This event had no adverse effect on the safety and health of the public. There were no safety system functional failures and all systems functioned as designed.
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER)
I/FIC FORM 3Il6A (9-2007)
3 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (11-2007)
CONTINUATION SHEET I
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 3. PAGE SeQUENTIAL IREVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit* 2 05000364 3
of 2010 001 00 NARRAl1VE (ff more space is required, USB additional copies ofNRC Form 366A) (17)
The Farley onsite standby power source is provided from four EDGs (1-2A, 1B, 2B, and 1C). The continuous service rating of 1 C EDG is 2,850 kW and 4,075 kW for EDGs 1-2A, 1B, and 2B. EDG 1-2A and 1C are A-Train and EDGs 1B and 2B are B-Train. Farley also has a fifth diesel generator (2C) that serves as a station blackout diesel, which can be manually aligned to supply B-Train power to either unit and power LOSP loads.
During the restoration portion of the test procedure, EDG 1-2A was operating and tied to the 2F Emergency Bus. When resetting the B2F Sequencer, the failure to operate the TTOS on the B2F Sequencer caused the EDG output breaker (DF08-2) to open. Sensing the LOSP condition, the B2F Sequencer properly functioned to re-close DF08*2 and sequentially start and connect loads on emergency Bus 2F. Both the 2A MDAFW pump and 2A HHSI pump sequentially started as designed to prevent overloading of the EOG. The EDG output breaker closure and sequencing of shutdown loads are required functions of an EDG and therefore had no adverse effect on the safety and health of the public. The B-train 2B EOG was operable and the 2B RHR pump was in operation throughout the event.
Corrective Action
The SI with LOSP test procedure was completed satisfactorily once the TTOS was properly operated.
MDAFW Pump 2A and HHSI Pump 2A were secured. The 4160 volt Bus 2F was aligned to the normal offsite power supply.
An enhanced Apparent Cause Determination was performed and corrective actions developed to address the failure to properly revise the test procedure after the design change.
SNC Operating Experience (OE) on the event has been issued.
Additlona'information
Previous Similar Events
LER 2009-001-00 Unit 1 and 2 - EDG 1 C Auto Start due to I nadvertent Relay Actuation PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER)
NRC FORM 3II6A (9-2007)