05000364/FIN-2010005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Station Guidance on Use of Extension Cords and Placement of Equipment in Safety-Related Cable Trays |
| Description | An NRC identified NCV of Technical Specification (T.S.) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to follow station maintenance procedures related to the use of extension cords, which resulted in an energized smoke eductor and its extension cord located within one inch of a safety-related cable tray. On September 30, 2010, the inspectors discovered an operating smoke eductor sitting atop safety-related cable tray AID15A in the Unit 2 component cooling water (CCW) pump and heat exchanger room. The inspectors also noted safety-related cable tray AHD21A ran parallel with, and approximately 36 inches above, cable tray AID15A. The inspectors evaluated the cables in both safety-related cable trays, and learned Unit 2 train A residual heat removal (RHR) and the hot shutdown panel were likely components that would be negatively affected in the event of a fire from this energized equipment. The inspectors immediately notified control room personnel, who then removed the smoke eductor and wrote condition report (CR) 2010113318. The failure to maintain an energized and operating smoke eductor with its extension cord greater than one inch from a safety-related cable tray as required by station procedure, FNP-0-ACP-59, Extension Cord Usage and Temporary Electrical Cable Installation Guidelines, is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems (MS) cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems responding to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a fire resulting from this energized equipment would challenge train A RHR pump and valves, and potentially lead to the train being inoperable. The significance of this finding was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of Attachment 4 and Appendix F, Attachment 1 of Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, SDP. Additionally, Phase 2 worksheets of Appendix F, Attachment 1 were used, and the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the safe shutdown path was deemed independent of fire damage state scenarios for the given fire ignition source. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross- cutting area because station personnel failed to follow guidance in station procedures related to the control of cable trays (H.4(b)). |
| Site: | Farley  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000364/2010005 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen B Caballero B Collins C Dykes E Crowe G Kuzo J Sowa R Carrion S Shaeffer |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000364/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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