05000361/FIN-2013002-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Two Examples of Failure to Follow Procedures for Control of Maintenance |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 for the failure by licensee personnel to follow Procedure SO23-XX-30, Nuclear Maintenance Order (NMO) Generation, Screening and Classification, Revision 9 EC1, and Procedure SO23-XX-36, Toolpouch Maintenance Program, Revision 1 EC1. Specifically, prior to March 5, 2013, the licensees Nuclear Maintenance Order Screening Committee failed to assign the appropriate job type and priority to seven corrosion-related nuclear maintenance orders in accordance with Procedure SO23-XX-30. Additionally, between February 9, 2012, and February 19, 2013, the Nuclear Maintenance Order Screening Committee failed to ensure the required conditions were met prior to assignment of toolpouch maintenance tasks for four nuclear notifications in accordance with Procedure SO23-XX-36. This issue has been entered into licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notifications 202346546 and 202351959. The inspectors determined that the failure by the licensees personnel to follow Procedure SO23-XX-30 to assign the appropriate job types and priority for corrosion-related nuclear maintenance orders, and the failure to follow Procedure SO23-XX-36 for the conduct of toolpouch maintenance were performance deficiencies. These performance deficiencies were more than minor, and therefore a finding, because they were associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors determined that Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, was appropriate based on the plant conditions present when most of the examples of this performance deficiency occurred. The finding did not require a quantitative assessment because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making component, because the Nuclear Maintenance Order Screening Committee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when assigning job types and tool pouch maintenance tasks for nuclear notifications |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2013002 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Taylor R Lantz G George S Garchow J Reynoso J Laughlin G Warnick B Parks E Uribe S Hedger N Hernandez M Williams C Hale |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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