05000361/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to accomplish activities in accordance with procedures. Specifically, prior to March 4, 2013, the licensee failed to accomplish inspections and maintenance of the downstream face of the probable maximum flood berm in accordance with Attachments 1 and 3 of Procedure SO123-XVIII-35, Inspection and Maintenance of Seawall, Offsite Probable Maximum Flood Berm and Channel, and Related Drainage Facilities. These issues have been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notifications NN 202346674, NN 202354058, and NN 202359197. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to accomplish inspections and maintenance in accordance with Procedure SO123-XVIII-35 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee routinely failed to maintain and inspect the downstream face of the berm for vegetation overgrowth, structural integrity, and animal burrows, resulting in identified degradation conditions during subsequent inspections. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, the finding screened as potentially risk important, affecting the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for external events mitigating systems, because the finding resulted in the degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a flooding initiating event. Therefore, a Region IV senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. Based on the inspectors observation of the condition of the berm, the senior reactor analyst determined that, even though the berm was degraded, it remained functional. Since the probable maximum flood berm remained functional, there was no quantifiable change to the core damage frequency or the large early release frequency. Therefore, the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because the licensee did not ensure personnel were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
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| Report | IR 05000361/2013002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Taylor R Lantz G George S Garchow J Reynoso J Laughlin G Warnick B Parks E Uribe S Hedger N Hernandez M Williams C Hale |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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