05000361/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Properly Screen Nuclear Notifications Results in Missed Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to implement procedures associated with evaluating the impact of degraded or nonconforming conditions on the operability of equipment required by technical specifications. Specifically, between December 2010 and February 2013, the inspectors identified 15 examples of operations personnel failing to follow Procedure SO123-XV-50.CAP-2, SONGS Nuclear Notification Screening, Attachment 3, step 6.2.9, resulting in the failure to complete the immediate operability determination or the immediate functionality assessment as required. This issue has been entered into licensees corrective action program as Nuclear Notification NN 202337603. The inspectors determined that the failure of operations personnel to follow Procedure SO123-XV-50.CAP-2 for screening nuclear notifications was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, was appropriate based on the plant conditions present when most of the examples of this performance deficiency occurred. The finding did not require a quantitative assessment because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of the human performance decision-making component, because operations personnel used nonconservative assumptions about depth of corrosion and corrosion rates to screen multiple degraded or nonconforming conditions out of the operability determination process |
| Site: | San Onofre  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000361/2013002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Taylor R Lantz G George S Garchow J Reynoso J Laughlin G Warnick B Parks E Uribe S Hedger N Hernandez M Williams C Hale |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - San Onofre - IR 05000361/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (San Onofre) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (San Onofre)
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