05000354/FIN-2018001-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Concern Regarding As-Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Allowable Limit |
| Description | On October 22, 2016, PSEG staff received results that the as-found setpoint tests for the main steam SRV pilot stage assemblies had exceeded the lift setting tolerance prescribed in technical specification 3.4.2.1. Specifically, ten of the 14 pilot stage assemblies tested experienced drift beyond the +/- 3 percent tolerance permitted by technical specification3.4.2.1. PSEG staff concluded that the cause of the setpoint drift was attributed to corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seating surfaces, and that is consistent with industry experience. This condition was reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants technical specifications. Based on a review of the Cycle 20 test results of the main steam SRV pilot stage assembly setpoint tests, and the nature of the predominant failure mechanism (corrosion bonding), the inspectors concluded that an unacceptable number (greater than one) of SRVs likely and reasonably became inoperable at some indeterminate time during the operating cycle. As documented in Inspection Results, 71152, Observations in this report, there is a history of SRV lift setpoint test failures due to a long-standing, generic issue with Target Rock 2-stage SRVs. In particular, PSEG staff has been active with the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group in evaluating SRV setpoint drift issues, and has an auditable history of their implementation of corrective actions, specifically intended to address their chronic SRV setpoint drift issue. Notwithstanding their efforts, PSEG staff has been unsuccessful in realizing an improvement in SRV performance in this area. PSEG staff has elected to implement additional corrective actions beginning the spring 2018 refueling outage. Specifically, they plan to reinstitute platinum coating of the pilot valve disc, and they plan to install the recently redesigned 3-stage Target Rock SRV in a phased approach.While this issue has not been effectively resolved, PSEGs post-test evaluations have demonstrated that, in their as-found condition, the SRVs would have satisfactorily performed their intended safety function (i.e.,mitigating the consequences of a postulated accident); and therefore, was of low safety significance.Additional NRC review is necessary to determine the appropriateness of PSEGs corrective actions to date, given the corrective action options available, and whether there was an associated violation of NRC requirements in addition to the consequential violation of technical specification 3.4.2.1. Planned Closure Actions: The NRC is continuing a review of the generic issue with the 2-stage Target Rock SRVs and the associated safety significance. The results of this review will be considered in determining the appropriateness of PSEGs corrective actions to date and whether an associated violation of NRC requirements existed, as well as the characterization of the consequential violation of technical specification 3.4.2.1.PSEG Actions: Specific to the fall 2016 SRV lift setpoint test results, all 14 of the SRVs were refurbished and adjusted as necessary; and were all tested and demonstrated to meet the required +/- 1 percent as-left tolerance prior to installation. PSEG also planned additional corrective actions, to be implemented during the spring 2018 refueling outage, including: 1) to re-evaluate the platinum coating process of the pilot valve disc for the existing 2-stage SRVs, and 2) to procure and install the recently re-designed 3-stage Target Rock SRV in a phased approach. Finally, PSEG communicated with the SRV vendor concerning the re-design of the 3-stage SRV following a prior identification (May 2015) of a substantial safety hazard to ensure that the re-design addressed the identified problems.Corrective Action References: Notification/Order 20747318, 20772038, and 80110848 This review closes LER 05000354/2016-003 and Supplemental LER 05000354/2016-003-01 |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2018001 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2018 (2018Q1) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Hawkins S Haney M Hardgrove M Draxton J Furia F Bower |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2018001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2018Q1
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