05000354/FIN-2015007-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate work order instructions and drawings resulting in improper installation of a safety-related SW valve. |
| Description | Green. The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because PSEG did not provide adequate work order instructions for the reinstallation of service water (SW) pump discharge isolation valve EAHV-2198C following planned valve maintenance in October 2013. Specifically, the inadequate work order instructions contributed directly to maintenance technicians installing the valve in the opposite orientation compared to the intended orientation. PSEG entered this issue into their corrective action program. In addition, PSEGs corrective actions included completing several associated technical evaluations, calculations, operability determinations, and motor-operated valve performance tests. The team determined that the failure to provide adequate work order instructions for the installation of safety-related SW valve 2198C was a performance deficiency. The team determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Report, Appendix B, because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems (SW) that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, the team determined that it was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 3j, because PSEGs associated operability and technical evaluations did not adequately consider the worst case conditions, resulting in a potential underestimation of the maximum required opening torque and in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the C SW train. The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency that affected the design and qualification of safety-related SW valve 2198C but did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. The team determined that this finding has a cross- cutting aspect in Human Performance, Documentation, in that PSEG failed to ensure that design documentation and work packages were complete, thorough, accurate, and current. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2015007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Brand J Kulp J Schoppy M Yeminy P Krohn S Kobylarz S Makor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2015007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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