05000354/FIN-2015002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with Safety Relief Valve Inlet Piping |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified involving PSEGs failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, PSEG did not identify and initiate a Corrective Action Process Notification Report for numerous tooling marks on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inlet piping connecting the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to the primary system following periodic removal and replacement. PSEG determined that the tooling marks could have resulted in stress risers on the RCS piping, making the pipe prone to cracking, and reduced the margin to the piping minimum wall thickness. PSEGs corrective actions included blending the tooling marks on all 14 SRV inlet pipes, verifying thickness above the minimum wall value, completing ultrasonic thickness measurements and magnetic particle surface examinations of the piping, and completing an RCS operational pressure test to verify the operability and functionality of the SRV inlet piping. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, which states in the Barrier Integrity section that for all non-pressurized thermal shock issues, the inspectors should evaluate the issue under the initiating events cornerstone (Exhibit 1). Using Exhibit 1 for Transient Initiators, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because after a reasonable assessment of the degradation; the condition did not adversely impact RCS leakage or functionality of available Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) mitigation capabilities. Specifically, the SRV inlet piping safety-related function, relied upon for accident mitigation and pressure relief, remained operable. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Work Management, because the organization did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process did not include the identification of risk (risk of the torque tool damaging the SRV pipe, and the failure to identify damage during inspections when performing maintenance on the SRVs) commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2015002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Fuller C Bixler G Dentel H Gray J Hawkins M Draxton R Nimitz S Haney T Burns T O'Hara R Vadella |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2015002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2015Q2
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