05000354/FIN-2015008-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Preventive Maintenance for Safety-Related Optical Isolators in the Residual Heat Removal System |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs, regarding PSEGs failure to adequately establish, implement, and justify a replacement frequency for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system optical isolators AT14 and AT18. These optical isolators were the most likely cause of an October 2013 RHR pump trip that resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) during Hope Creeks R18 refueling outage. PSEG determined that the optical isolators did not have an established replacement frequency, and they had been installed since original plant construction. PSEG replaced the optical isolators and established a replacement preventive maintenance (PM) task going forward. The inspectors determined that PSEG had previous opportunity to identify the deficient PM strategy and replace the optical isolators prior to the October 2013 loss of SDC. In response to this finding, PSEG plans to conduct a causal evaluation and document the basis for their new PM frequency. This issue is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the RHR optical isolators were determined to be the most likely cause of the B RHR pump trip and associated loss of SDC on October 17, 2013. The inspectors, with the assistance of a Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA), used IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to evaluate the safety significance of this issue. Based upon Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2, this issue required a Phase 2 analysis, because the performance deficiency resulted in an actual loss of decay heat removal event. Using Attachment 3, Phase 2 Significance Determination Process Template for BWRs During Shutdown, Worksheet 5, the SRA determined this issue was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, which states that licensees thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. In this case, when the PCM template process was initially implemented in 2008, PSEG failed to evaluate AT14 and AT18 against the applicable PCM template (Signal Conditioner Electronic) and generate replacement PMs. Although this performance deficiency dates back to 2008, the inspectors determined the issue is reflective of current licensee performance, because PSEGs root cause evaluation (RCE) and the associated PM change request (PCR), conducted in 2013, constituted a second missed opportunity for PSEG to evaluate the applicable PCM template against the PM strategy for AT14 and AT18. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2015008 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Dentel J Hawkins M Draxton M Fannon N Warnek |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2015008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2015Q1
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