05000354/FIN-2012003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Average Power Range Monitor Flow Unit Summers
Out of Tech Spec Tolerance |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of very low safety significance of TSs 3.3.1 and 6.8.1 because PSEGs written procedure (HC.IC-CC.SE-0032) was not adequately established and implemented for performing the weekly channel test and calibration of the flow biased APRMs that input into the simulated thermal power upscale RPS trip. Specifically, the procedure provided inadequate instructions for calculating total reactor recirculation drive flow while in single loop operations (SLO). PSEGs corrective actions included revision of the appropriate procedures and development of a schedule template (including required surveillances) for entry into and return from SLO. The violation was entered into the CAP as notification 20549760. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, incorrect calibration of the APRM flow units resulted in the APRM flow biased setpoint being non-conservative and exceeding the associated TS limiting safety system setpoint (LSSS) allowable value for a period of time that was considered a condition prohibited by TS. The inspectors performed a Phase I screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources component, because PSEG did not ensure that a TS-required RPS calibration procedure was complete, accurate, and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the formula provided in the APRM flow unit summer procedure that calculated the drive flow was incorrect. The formula provided in the procedure was for dual loop operation, not for SLO. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2012003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Burns A Patel R Nimitz F Bower A Burritt C Williams |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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