05000354/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Preconditioning of the Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Relief Valves |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because PSEG conducted unacceptable preconditioning of the reactor building to torus vacuum relief valve. Specifically, PSEGs surveillance test procedure for these valves cycled the valve (H1GS- 1GSPSV-5032) prior to recording the as-found opening setpoint required to meet Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.4.2.b.2.a. PSEGs immediate corrective actions included revising the surveillance test procedure to record the as-found setpoint before cycling the valve manually. The violation was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as notification 20554080. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, preconditioning of the reactor building to torus vacuum relief opening setpoint could mask its actual as-found condition and result in an inability to verify its operability and potentially make it difficult to determine whether the vacuum breaker would perform its intended safety function during an event. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, spent fuel pool, or standby gas treatment system, did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or toxic atmosphere, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment and heat removal components, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action component, because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate a prior problem such that the problem resolution addressed the extent of condition. Specifically, PSEGs extent of condition for notification 20370021, Potential Preconditioning BJHV-F004, did not go beyond operations procedures and review maintenance procedures for unacceptable preconditioning. Therefore, PSEG did not identify the unacceptable preconditioning of the reactor building to torus vacuum relief valve opening setpoint because the surveillance test was in a maintenance procedure. |
Site: | Hope Creek ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000354/2012003 Section 1R12 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Burns A Patel R Nimitz F Bower A Burritt C Williams |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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