05000354/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, Design Control, in that, PSEG did not ensure the adequacy of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) design under post-accident conditions. Specifically, PSEG did not evaluate the impact of elevated temperature in the HPCI room on the operability of the HPCI system during a postulated design basis small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and a single failure of the A emergency diesel generator (EDG). PSEG determined through subsequent evaluation that HPCI was operable but non-conforming because there was a potentialfor HPCI system to isolate unnecessarily on high differential temperature during the extreme winter low temperatures. PSEG plans to implement a design change to reduce the setpoints of the HPCI room coolers so that the initial HPCI room temperature is maintained at a lower temperature before extreme winter conditions. The violation was entered into the CAP as notifications 205 1 81 24 and 205201 06. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, PSEG had not evaluated HPCI operability using actual HPCI room temperatures during normal operating conditions, and as a result, HPCI\\\'s reliability during the most limiting accident conditions was not assured during extreme winter low temperatures. The inspectors reviewed this condition using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and in consultation with a Region I senior reactor analyst (SRA), concluded that this issue screened to very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action component, because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate a prior problem such that the problem resolution addressed the causes and the extent of condition. Specifically, PSEG\\\'s evaluation for notification 20381041, HPCI Operability During Station Blackout (SBO) Conditions, did not identify the impact of the actual initial HPCI room temperature on other accident conditions, such as a SBLOCA and LOOP with the single failure of an EDG and, therefore, did not identify that the actual HPCI room temperature was beyond the HPCI design document assumption that temperature should be between 60 F and 100\\\'F |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2011004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Patel F Bower A Burritt J Hawkins C Douglas P Kaufman J Schoppy J Furia |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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