05000354/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Identify Inadequate RHR Pipe Vent Configuration |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because PSEG did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, PSEG did not identify that the configuration of the residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge piping vents would not allow for complete venting of the piping. During a system walkdown to evaluate the adequacy of the PSEG response to Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems, the inspectors identified a vent valve pipe connected to the side rather than the top of the RHR discharge piping. The inspectors determined that this pipe configuration would not allow for complete venting of the RHR discharge pipe and found that this vent was credited by PSEG as the vent path to meet design basis assumptions and was referenced in the GL response. Following identification of the issue, PSEG conducted ultrasonic test (UT) examinations of the discharge piping to verify the line was filled with water to assure operability of the RHR system and entered the issue into the CAP to evaluate additional corrective actions to address the potential void area. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was determined to be a design deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, PSEG did not properly oversee contractors who performed the assessment for the GL, and the contractors did not identify that the credited RHR vent path would not allow complete venting of the system. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2010004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Welling J Furia T Fish A Patel J Tomlinson A Burritt A Turilin K Mangan J Schoppy |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2010004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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