On August 26, 2010, an issue with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.16, "Spent Fuel Storage," Bases was identified. TS 3.7.16 requires fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool ( SFP) to be placed in racks per the criteria of TS Figure 3.7.16-1, which references the TS Bases. The TS 3.7.16 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action requires initiation of action to move non-complying assemblies to an allowable location with an Action Completion Time of "Immediately.
On August 26, 2010, there were assemblies in the SFP that did not comply with TS. This condition existed since conversion to Improved Standard TS (ITS), which omitted a SFP rack storage patterns TS Bases sentence. Additionally, action to bring the assemblies into compliance with TSs was not initiated "immediately.
The root cause was an inadequate assessment of risks and consequences when making changes in the guidance for describing acceptable analyzed assembly storage patterns resulting in a TS change that omitted information or deferred an LCO to administrative procedures during the SFP re-rack in 2001. Because assemblies in the SFP were in an acceptable pattern per the criticality analysis, there was no safety significance. Corrective Actions include a TS Bases change to permit fuel storage in the SFP racks as analyzed.
This event is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS. |
Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
Initial Plant Conditions:
On August 26, 2010, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power.
System Description:
The Spent Fuel Pool facility [DB] at the DBNPS is designed to assure the safe storage of irradiated fuel assemblies under normal and accident conditions. The Spent Fuel Pool structure provides for the containment and confinement of the fuel assemblies, and prevents significant reduction in coolant inventory under normal and accident conditions.
The 21 high density Spent Fuel Pool racks [DB-RK] store a maximum of 1,624 fuel assemblies. The rack cells are arranged in a rectangular array of parallel rows. Boral®, which is a neutron absorber, is attached to all four sides of each cell. Between individual racks, and between peripheral racks and the pool walls, there is a gap. This gap forms a "flux trap" which reduces neutron movement between fuel assemblies in adjacent racks. The criticality analysis for the Spent Fuel Pool (Holtec Report No. HI 2002359) concluded the combination of Boral and flux traps provides the option to position each fuel assembly in three different patterns within the racks — Mixed Zone Three Region, Checkerboard, and Homogeneous Loading. These loading patterns maintain k-effective less than 0.95 for fuel assemblies with initial nominal enrichments less than or equal to 5.05 weight percent Uranium-235, assuming the Spent Fuel Pool water is unborated. Fuel stored in the Spent Fuel Pool is administratively limited to a maximum nominal enrichment of 5.0 weight percent Uranium-235. This allows compliance with subsection "b" of 10 CFR 50.68, "Criticality Accident Requirements." The position of a fuel assembly within a pattern is dependent upon its "category". The category is based on the burnup/initial enrichment restrictions contained in the Technical Specifications. The detailed requirements for use of each pattern, or combination of patterns, are contained in administrative procedures.
During accident conditions, credit may be taken for the Boron in the Spent Fuel Pool water when showing k-effective is maintained less than or equal to 0.95. The criticality analysis determined a Boron concentration of approximately 630 parts per million (ppm) in the Spent Fuel Pool water is required to maintain k-effective at 0.945 for the worst-case fuel handling accident, (i.e., a 5.05 weight percent enriched assembly misloaded in a Checkerboard pattern).
Technical Specification(s):
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.16, "Spent Fuel Storage," Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.16 requires the fuel assemblies stored in the Spent Fuel Pool be placed in the storage racks in accordance with the criteria shown in TS Figure 3.7.16-1. TS Figure 3.7.16-1 includes a NOTE that the approved loading patterns are specified in the TS Bases. In accordance with TS LCO 3.7.16, when the requirements of the LCO are not met, actions to move the non-complying fuel assembly to an allowable location shall be initiated "immediately" (pursued without delay and in a controlled manner per TS Definition 1.3).
Technical Specifications Bases Document:
The TS Bases Document (Revision 7 in effect at the time of discovery) stated "The restrictions delineated in Figure 3.7.16-1 and the Required Actions are consistent with the criticality safety analysis performed for the Spent Fuel Pool (Ref. 1)." Reference 1 is the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Technical Specifications Bases Document (continued):
Report (USAR) Section 9.1.2.1. The TS Bases Document goes on to state "the criticality analyses qualify the high density rack modules for storage of the fuel assemblies in one of three different loading patterns subject to certain restrictions: Mixed Zone Three Region (MZTR), Checkerboard (CB), and Homogeneous Loading (HL). Figure 3.7.16-1 provides the Category-specific burnup/enrichment limitations. Different loading patterns may be used in different rack modules, provided each rack module contains only one loading pattern. The loading pattern restrictions are maintained in fuel handling administrative procedures.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
On August 26, 2010, a corrective action document was initiated to document an issue with the Bases for TS 3.7.16. The TS Bases in effect at the time described three acceptable fuel loading patterns within the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The TS 3.7.16 TS Bases stated that fuel stored within each individual rack module shall be the same pattern and that different loading patterns may be used in different rack modules, provided each rack module contains only one loading pattern.
Technical Specification Change - Spent Fuel Pool Re-Rack Project In 2001, in support of the DBNPS SFP re-rack project, a License Amendment Request (LAR) was developed to revise the TS (TS 3.9.13 at the time) to reflect the design and safety analysis change supporting the re-racking of the SFP. As part of the LAR, it was requested that the specific fuel loading pattern restrictions be relocated to administration procedures. Additionally, the TS Bases did not specifically provide the criticality analysis as a reference. This change in essence took the specific fuel loading restrictions which were previously in the TSs and therefore could not be revised without prior NRC approval and relocated the requirements into an administrative procedure. The TS LCO was revised in accordance with the approved License Amendment 247 to refer to the TS Bases for fuel loading pattern considerations. The TS Bases was revised to state:
"The criticality analyses qualify the high density rack modules for storage of fuel assemblies in one of three different loading patterns, subject to certain restrictions: Mixed Zone Three Region, Checkerboard, and Homogeneous Loading. Figure 3.9-3 provides the Category-specific burn up/enrichment limitations. Different loading patterns may be used in different rack modules, provided each rack module contains only one loading pattern. Two different loading patterns may be used in a single rack module, subject to certain additional restrictions. The loading pattern restrictions are maintained in fuel handling administrative procedures.
This LAR and the License Amendment 247 allowed the specific restrictions on the loading pattern for the high density racks to be located in an administrative procedure instead of a licensing basis document. Since the specific loading pattern restrictions were not listed in the TS Bases, this contributed to the confusion over what was required for TS LCO compliance after the sentence in question was omitted in 2006.
Improved Standard Technical Specification Change — Spent Fuel Pool TS In 2006, during the Improved Standard Technical Specification (ITS) conversion, a sentence was omitted from the SFP Storage TS Bases that stated "Two different loading patterns may be used in a single rack module, subject to certain additional restrictions." The ITS packages did not highlight the difference between the Current Technical Specification (CTS) Bases and the ITS Bases, thus making it Description of Event (continued):
unlikely for a reviewer to discover the deleted sentence. Personnel involved in the ITS conversion process recall this sentence being deleted based upon the belief that the sentence was redundant and non-consequential. They believed this change had no impact on compliance with the TS LCO and was technically safe.
CAUSE OF EVENT:
The root cause for fuel assemblies being located in the spent fuel pool in a pattern prohibited by the Technical Specifications is less than adequate assessment of the risks and consequences when making changes in the guidance for describing acceptable analyzed fuel assembly storage patterns in support of the SFP re-rack project LAR. Relocating specific spent fuel pool loading pattern restrictions from the TS to administrative procedures eventually allowed other pertinent information to be eliminated from the TS Bases without the risks and consequences of the change to be realized.
A contributing cause for fuel assemblies located in the spent fuel pool in a pattern prohibited by the Technical Specifications is less than adequate accountability for literal compliance with Technical Specifications. The less than adequate accountability for literal compliance with Technical Specifications resulted in several organizations believing the problem was administrative in nature without discussing literal compliance with Technical Specifications.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
The use of the USAR-described "combination of patterns" or previous TS 3.9.13 Bases "Two different loading patterns may be used in a single rack module" is consistent with the criticality safety analysis performed for the high density spent fuel storage racks, as documented in Holtec report HI-2002359, and with the bases documented in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report for DBNPS License Amendment 247, which implemented the changes associated with the installation of the existing high density spent fuel storage racks. Because the fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool were always in an acceptable pattern per the criticality safety analysis, this issue had no safety significance.
REPORTABILITY DISCUSSION:
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.16, "Spent Fuel Storage," Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires fuel assemblies stored in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) to be placed in spent fuel pool storage racks in accordance with the criteria shown in Figure 3.7.16-1. The TS 3.7.16 LCO Action requires actions to move the non-complying fuel assembly to an allowable location with an Action Completion Time of "Immediately." On August 26, 2010, there were assemblies in the SFP that did not comply with TS 3.7.16 and this condition existed in the past since conversion to Improved Standard TS (ITS) in 2006. Additionally, action to bring the assemblies into compliance with TSs was not initiated in a timeframe commensurate with the required completion time. Therefore, this issue is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as operation in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
The TS 3.7.16 Bases was changed on August 27, 2010, to reflect the analyzed configuration of two (2) different loading patterns in a single rack module in the Spent Fuel Pool.
A guidance document has been developed for Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) to use when reviewing corrective action documents and determining operability. This document includes emphasis regarding literal compliance with the TS and the TS Bases, and the Shift Managers' (SRO) responsibility for ensuring the plant operates in compliance with license requirements and regulations.
The affected personnel in the organizations who had input into the decision that the Spent Fuel Pool configuration was in compliance with TS LCO 3.7.16 will review the root cause analysis of this event to understand the literal compliance and conservative decision-making lessons-learned from this event.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
No prior similar events were identified. The root cause evaluation found no other occurrence of information being deleted by ITS causing the plant to be in noncompliance with the TS. Additionally, no other similar instances were identified where TS LCOs referred to the TS Bases for additional guidance.
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| 05000220/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Post Maintenance Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000410/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Scram Due to Inadvertent Actuation of the Redundant Reactivity Control System During Maintenance | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000395/LER-2010-001 | Reactor Building Cooling Units Reduced Air Flow Rate Below Technical Specification Limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000382/LER-2010-001 | Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Single Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000374/LER-2010-001 | High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room Ventilation Control Relay | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000373/LER-2010-001 | Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area. | | | 05000370/LER-2010-001 | Loose connection in a panel board serving a Solid State Protection System Train concurrent with redundant train maintenance could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000261/LER-2010-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000263/LER-2010-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000255/LER-2010-001 | Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to a Service Water Pump Shaft Coupling Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-2010-001 | Engineered Safety Features Steam Line Pressure Dynamics Modules Discovered Outside of Technical Specification Values | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000306/LER-2010-001 | Unit 2 Turbine Trip during Reactor Shutdown Resulting in a Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000305/LER-2010-001 | Safety Injection Pump Recirculation Line Isolation Results in Violation of Technical Specifications | | | 05000298/LER-2010-001 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000269/LER-2010-001 | Standby Shutdown Facility Letdown Line Orifice Strainer Blocked by Valve Gasket Material | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b) | | 05000282/LER-2010-001 | Unanalyzed Condition Due to Postulated High Energy Line Break On Cooling Water System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000277/LER-2010-001 | Multiple Slow Control Rods Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000361/LER-2010-001 | Broken Manual Valve Prevents Timely Condensate Storage Tank Isolation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000483/LER-2010-001 | Emergency Core Cooling System MODE 4 Operating Practices Prohibited by current Technical Specification 3.5.3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000498/LER-2010-001 | Unit Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000316/LER-2010-001 | Valid Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in Response to Valid Steam Generator Low-Low Levels | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000321/LER-2010-001 | Corrosion Induced Bonding Results in Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Drift | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-2010-001 | Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Reactor Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000413/LER-2010-001 | Technical Specification Violation Associated with Failure to Perform Offsite Circuit Verification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000440/LER-2010-001 | Invalid Isolation Signal Results in Shutdown Cooling Interruption | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000424/LER-2010-001 | Breaker Failure Results in I B Train Containment Cooling System Being Declared Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000416/LER-2010-001 | Automatic Reactor Scram On Decreasing Reactor Water Level Due To Inadvertent Reactor Feed Pump Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000249/LER-2010-001 | OPRM Power Supply Failure during Maintenance Results in Unit 3 Automatic Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000251/LER-2010-001 | Two Shutdown Bank Rods Were Dropped from Fully Withdrawn Position | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000261/LER-2010-002 | Plant Trip due to Electrical Fault | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-2010-002 | Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000335/LER-2010-002 | Opened ECCS Boundary Door in Violation of Identified Compensatory Measures | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000334/LER-2010-002 | 270 Degree Circumferential Flaw Found on Residual Heat Removal System Drain Valve Socket Weld | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000316/LER-2010-002 | Containment Divider Barrier Seal Mounting Bolts Not Properly Installed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000250/LER-2010-002 | Fuel Transfer Pump Failure Renders 3B Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000269/LER-2010-002 | Manual Reactor Trip due to 1A1 and 1A2 Reactor Coolant PumDHigh Vibration Indication | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000315/LER-2010-002 | Manual Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Response to Main Feedpump Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000271/LER-2010-002 | Inoperability of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves due to Degraded Thread Seals | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000277/LER-2010-002 | Improperly Fastened Rod Hanger Results in Inoperable Subsystem of Emergency Service Water | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000413/LER-2010-002 | Discovery of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leak at Thermowell 1NCTW5850 Seal Weld. | | | 05000282/LER-2010-002 | Postulated Flooding of Unit 1 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Motor Starters Could Have Resulted In Reduced Fuel Oil Inventory | | | 05000414/LER-2010-002 | Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Road
York, SC 29745
803-701-4251
803-701-3221 fax
December 15, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:�Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Licensee Event Report 414/2010-002
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 414/2010-002,
Revision 0 entitled, "Technical Specification Violation Involving Mode Change with Inoperable
Auxiliary Feedwater System Train Due to Closed Pump Discharge Valves".
This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the
public.
If there are any questions on this report, please contact L.J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084.
Sincerely,
faius4- A
James R. Morris
LJR/s
Attachment
www.duke-energy.corn (14
Document Control Desk
Page 2
December 15, 2010
xc (with attachment):
L.A. Reyes
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II
Marquis One Tower
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200
Atlanta, GA 30303-1257
J.H. Thompson (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 8-G9A
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
G.A. Hutto, Ill
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station
INPO Records Center
700 Galleria Place
Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013
(10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported
lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send commentsLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to
infocollectssesource@nre.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used(See reverse for required number of to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRCdigits/characters for each block)
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the info(mation
collection.
1.. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I3. PAGE
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 05000414 1 OF 7
4. TITLE
Technical Specification Violation Involving Mode Change with Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater System Train Due
to Closed Pump Discharge ValvesD • | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000306/LER-2010-002 | Unit 2 Turbine Shutdown Due To the Loss of a Main Feed Water Pump That Resulted in a Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-2010-002 | Piping Leak Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000382/LER-2010-002 | Main Feedwater Isolation Valve B exceeded allowed outage time due to tubing connection failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000370/LER-2010-002 | ref Energy®
REGIS T. REPKO
Vice President
McGuire Nuclear Station
Duke Energy
MGO1VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville, NC 28078
980-875-4111
980-875-4809 fax
regis.repko(Codu ke-energy.corn
10 CFR 50.73
May 10, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
D
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Docket Nos. 50-370
Licensee Event Report (LER) 370/2010-02, Supplement 1
Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-10-05982
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Supplement 1 to
Licensee Event Report 370/2010-02, regarding past inoperability of the Unit 2 "A" Train
Nuclear Service Water System and satisfies the commitment to supplement the LER
following completion of the root cause analysis
This supplement to LER 370/2010-02 supersedes the LER previously submitted
December 20, 2010. Completion of the root cause analysis has not affected the original
reporting criteria which was completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B),
an Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v) (B),
any Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function
needed to remove residual heat.
Additionally, the supplement did not affect the significance of the event which was
considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.
If questions arise regarding this LER, contact Rick Abbott at 980-875-4685.
Very truly yours,
Zi1:77
Regis T. Repko
Attachment
www. duke-energy. corn
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
May 10, 2011
Page 2
cc:�V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Marquis One Tower
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NC, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257
Jon H. Thompson (Addressee Only)
Senior Project Manager (McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
J. B. Brady
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
McGuire Nuclear Station
W. L. Cox Ill, Section Chief
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Division of Environmental Health
Radiation Protection Section
1645 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-1645
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB. NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2013
(10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: SO hours.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to info
(See reverse for required number of collects resmirceOnrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory
digits/characters for each block) Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-01041, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC
20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid
OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, the information collection.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
McGuire Nuclear Station,2Unit 2 05000-212
0370 OF-7
4. TITLE
Unit 2 Nuclear Service Water System "A" Train Past Inoperable due to
Failed Strainer Differential Pressure Instrument. | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000369/LER-2010-002 | | | | 05000456/LER-2010-002 | Limiting Condition for Operation Action Not Completed Within the Required Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000249/LER-2010-003 | Steam Leak Results in HPCI Inoperability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000251/LER-2010-003 | Damaged Speed Sensor Caused the 4A Emergency Diesel Generator to be Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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