05000346/FIN-2013004-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary to this requirement, on September 24, 2013, an equipment operator failed to adequately perform procedure DB-SP-03218, High Pressure Injection Train 1 Pump and Valve Test. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify step 4.3.10 of DB-SP-03218 was performed to request an instrument and controls technician to open high pressure drain valve HP4BA1 to place a test pressure gauge in service. The equipment operator was not able to contact the instrument and controls technician and signed off the procedure step as completed. The valve to the test pressure gauge was never opened and the test pressure gauge displayed, and was recorded multiple times as, zero for the duration of the test. Note 4.3.11 of DB-SP-03218 specifically indicated the expected pressure of the test gauge was approximately 25 psig. The procedure was then completed without noticing the test pressure gauge discrepancy and the acceptance criteria were incorrectly signed off as acceptable. The SRO reviewing the test acceptance criteria identified the error, and the test was re-performed satisfactorily on September 26, 2013. The objective of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). A key attribute of this objective is human performance, and specifically, configuration control. In accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective. The licensees failure to complete DB-SP-03218 as written resulted in additional inoperability and unavailability time for HPI train 2 during re-performance of the test procedure. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2013-14882. A full apparent cause evaluation was in progress at the end of the inspection period to determine appropriate corrective actions. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2013004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop J Neurauter P Pelke D Kimble T Briley J Steffes |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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