05000346/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Containment Isolation Valve Rendered Inoperable by Wrong Component Operator Error |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, were identified for the licensees failure to properly implement the procedure for the Hydrogen Dilution System Train 1 quarterly surveillance test. Specifically, a non-licensed operator inadvertently repositioned the incorrect motor-operated valve (MOV) and caused an unplanned entry into Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, Condition A, for an inoperable component cooling water (CCW) containment isolation valve (CIV). Upon identification, the valve was tested and returned to operable status within the TS allowable time. The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to follow plant procedures and the mispositioning of plant equipment would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone because a CIV forms part of the containment pressure boundary that provides reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accident or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. The inspectors used Exhibit 3 Barrier Integrity Screening Questions for the reactor containment. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components; and there was no impact on the hydrogen control function in containment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices Component, because personnel failed to use human error prevention techniques to ensure that work was performed safely. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2013002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble D Reeser E Sanchez J Cameron R Langstaff R Winter S Bell T Briley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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