05000346/FIN-2013002-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain applicable written procedures for the safety-related systems and activities recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Section 9(a), Procedures for Performing Maintenance, of RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, further states, in part, that: Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this requirement, during the 17th midcycle outage in the fall of 2011 for DH Train 1 and the 17th refuel outage in the spring of 2012 for DH Train 2, the licensees instructions for replacing the DH pump mechanical seal flow cyclone separators failed to provide sufficient details to ensure that required internal spacers were installed as required. The omission of the spacers subjected the DH pump mechanical seal flow cyclone separators to potential debris-induced clogging, thereby reducing the reliability of the DH pumps themselves. The objective of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). A key attribute of this objective is human performance, and specifically, procedure quality. In accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective. The licensees failure to provide adequately detailed written procedures and instructions for the replacement of the DH pump mechanical seal flow cyclone separators adversely impacted the reliability of each DH pump, as discussed in the paragraph above. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2012-18831. Corrective actions planned or completed by the licensee included revisions to the applicable drawings and work instructions associated with this activity. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2013002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble D Reeser E Sanchez J Cameron R Langstaff R Winter S Bell T Briley |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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