ML20203F844

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 130 to License NPF-43
ML20203F844
Person / Time
Site: Fermi 
Issue date: 02/08/1999
From:
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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Shared Package
ML20203F836 List:
References
NUDOCS 9902180325
Download: ML20203F844 (3)


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UNITED STATES f

0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasHmorou, o.c. seassam l

' SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43 DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI 2 DOCKET NO.~ 50-341 4

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 20,1997, as supplemer,ted on July 2,1997, and March 10 and April 9, 1998, the Detroit Edison Company (DECO or the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi 2.

The proposed amendment would revise the TS by removing surveillance requirement (SR) 4.4.1.1.2 for setting the reactor recirculation system motor-generator (MG) set scoop tube stops. In accordance with the licensee's commitment in the submittal dated June 20,1997, this SR would be relocated, with modificatione, to the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).

The July 2,1997, and ibrch 10 and April 9,1998, supplements provided additional clarifying -

information that was wt.a the scope of the original Federal Register notice and did not change

the staff's initial proposed no significant hazards considerations determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 Reauirements For TS Contents i

Section 18h of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act') requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TSs as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36, in particular, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), " Surveillance requirements," states:

Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.

2.2 MG Set Scoco Tube Stoos Desian Bases Each MG set has both an electrical and a mechanical high speed stop for the scoop tube.

These stops limit the maximum speed of the reactor recirculation pumps. The mechanical stop is assumed to operate to limit the reactor power during a slow flow increase event, which is a desigr. basis event for operation in the Maximum Extended Operating Domain (MEOD). Report NEDC-31843P, " Fermi 2 Maximum Extended Operating Domain Analysis," dated July 1990,

(proprietary information - not publicly available) provides additional information related to this function. As described in Section 6.7 of that report, the slow flow increase event is not 9902180325 990200 PDR ADOCK 05000341 P

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" terminated by a scram, but stabilizes at a new core power corresponding to the maximum possible core flow (i.e., the flow corresponding to the mechanical stop for the scoop tube). The maximum core flow is considered in making the determination that the flow-dependent minimum critical power ratio (MCPR,) and flow-dependent maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR,) limits are not exceeded.

Implementation of the MEOD was approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 69 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 on May 15,1991. The cycle-specific MCPR, and MAPLHGR, limits are contained in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). The COLR reflects that these limits are based, in part, on the maximum core flow as limited by the MG set mechanical scoop tube stop setting listed in the COLR.

3.0 EVALUATION Current SR 4 A.1.1.2 states that the mechanical and electrical stops "shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with oversr>eed setpoints less than or equal to 110% and 107%, respectively, ci rated core flow, at least once per 18 months."

In its June 20,1997, submittal, the licensee indicated the following:

1.

The MG set mechanical stop setting is considered in the calculation of the MCPR, and MAPLHGR, limits as described in NEDC-31843P. The electrical stop also functions to limit the maximum speed of the associated MG set and has a set point lower than the mechanical stop. However, operation of the electrical stop is not credited in any of the accident or transient analyses.

2.

The cycle-specific MCPR and MAPLHGR operating limits presented in the COLR are established such that postulated transients and accidents will not, as analyzed, result in the violation of fuel safety limits, implicit in the establishment of the cperating limits is the assumption that the plant is operated and conficured in accordance with the plant design and licensing bases, including the information contained in the UFSAR. Details of the configuration and routine activities necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the limits are satisfied are generally not placed in the TS but are maintained in the UFSAR. Changes to the UFSAR are controlled under programs developed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests and experiments."

3.

Compliance with the TS provides assurance that the plant will be operated consistent with adequate protection of public health and safety. Location of the configuration and routine support activities in the UFSAR provides flexibility for licensee control of these details under an appropriate framework of regulatory control. In addition, the proposed relocation is consistent with the boiling-water reactor improved standard technical specifications (iSTS), NUREG-1433, Rev.1, which has been approved by the NRC.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and related documentation (e.g., TS, COLR, iSTS). The staff concluded that the electrical MG set stop was not credited in the UFSAR transient or accident analyses. The mechanical MG set stop is credited for the slow flow increase event under the MEOD analysis and the limit is it'cluded in the COLR as an input for both the MCPR, and MAPLHGR, cperating limits. A change to the set point in the COLR would require detailed analyses by the licensee and would have to be reported to the NRC in

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3-accordance with TS 6.9.3. TSs 3.2.1, " Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate," and 3.2.2,

" Minimum Critical Power Ratio," require the licensee to comply with the MAPLHGR, and MCPR, operating limits, respectively.

The staff then reviewed the proposed change versus 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). The setting of the stops does not assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, or that the limiting conditions for operation are met.

Rather, the set point of the mechanical stop is an input used to determine the MCPR, and i

MAPLHGR, operating limits. The licensee monitors plant conditions to assure that operation is within the safety limits and that the limi4ng conditions for operation are met. Therefore, the staff concludes that the activity related to setting the stops does not need to be a surveillance requirement in the TS.

In addition to relocating SR 4.4.1.1.2 to the UFSAR, the licensee proposed to make changes to the surveillance testing methodology once the information is in the UFSAR. The licensee must evaluate these changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 to determine whether they are permissible without prior staff approval.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the j

amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the i

types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individua! er cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 38134). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), r ) environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is

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reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by 1

operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the i

common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:

A. Kugler A. Ulc,es Date: February 8, 1999 I

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