05000335/LER-2009-002
| St.Llucie | |
| Event date: | 02-18-2009 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 2-0-2009 |
| 3352009002R00 - NRC Website | |
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 2009 - 002
Description of the Event
On February 10 and 18, 2009, an email with an attached file, that was thought to be a non-Safeguards Excel spreadsheet matrix for an EP Hostile Action Based drill, was transmitted to a Security Director at another nuclear plant. The Excel attachment actually contained a two-tab file; Tab 1, a Force on Force Matrix (designated as SGI), and Tab 2, an EP Hostile Action drill event matrix, (non-SGI). The Security Director opened the email on his Blackberry and Tab 1 opened first, revealing a Force on Force Event Matrix which was designated as SGI. PSL Security was immediately notified and notifications and reportability determinations were made. It was also determined that the file was also placed into a public folder on the Site's local area network (LAN).
Cause of the Event
An evaluation concluded the cause of the event was a lack of guidance for declassifying electronic SGI files prior to transferring files from a protected environment to 'a non-protected environment. Inadequate peer-checks and pre-job briefs, and lack of understanding of Excel spreadsheet features, also contributed to the event.
Analysis of the Event
On February 18, 2009, it was determined that information designated as Safeguards Information (SGI) was improperly transmitted via an unprotected network system to an off-site recipient. Failure to properly protect and control SGI by transmitting information via an unprotected network is a violation of 10CFR 73.21, Requirements for the Protection of Safeguards Information.
Analysis of Safety Significance Although the information was marked as SGI, no basis for the SGI determination was provided or otherwise identified in the document. A subsequent assessment concluded that, although designated as SGI, the subject information would provide no significant assistance to an adversary in committing an act of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). Additionally, given that the information is similar in format and content to information provided in NEI 03-11; and cannot be associated with a particular plant; reflects a drill scenario with incomplete and perhaps outdated information, the information is not deemed exploitable.
Upon further evaluation, FPL has determined that the subject SGI information would not substantially assist in the circumvention of security systems or would not significantly assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or theft of SNM. Accordingly, this event did not require a one-hour FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 2009 - 002 phone call pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, and, therefore, FPL makes this voluntary report.
Based on the reviews taken and evaluation performed, the potential safety consequences of the event are judged to be low and would not have been a significant impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
The corrective actions and supporting actions were entered into the Site corrective action program. Any changes to the proposed actions will be managed under the corrective action program.
Immediate Corrective Actions
1. FPL Information Management (IM) deleted/erased the Excel file from the Local Area Network (LAN).
2.Affected Workstation computers were removed from service and re-imaged in order to erase any temporary files that may have remained; back-up systems purged.
3.Information Technology group at the receiving Site was notified and the documents removed from their email.
Near Term Corrective Actions 1.Revise Procedure NAP-600 to prohibit the declassification and transfer of electronic SGI files from an SGI computer to a non-SGI device without written approval from the St. Lucie Security Manager (or Security Safeguards Coordinator as a designee).
2.Implement physical barriers (blank device) to control the use of USB ports.
Similar Events A three year historical search of SITRIS was performed for PSL. The search resulted in two instances; one relative to an audit finding regarding the destruction of electronic media classified as SGI; and one related to a concern that the SGI stand alone computers were not receiving virus scanning updates. No instances of inappropriate electronic transmission (via condition reporting system or e-mail) from PSL were identified.
Failed Components
NA