05000335/FIN-2013004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable for a Period Greater Than the Allowed Outage Time |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.b was identified due to the licensee operating with an inoperable emergency diesel generator (EDG) for longer than the allowed outage time (AOT) of 14 days without taking the required TS actions. Specifically, during a relay replacement, the licensee installed a diode with a lead that had an un-insulated butt splice. This un-insulated butt splice caused an electrical short circuit resulting in a blown fuse in the 2A EDG start circuitry and was the cause of the EDG failing to start on March 13, and again on June 10, 2013. Consequently, the licensee operated with an inoperable EDG for a period longer than the AOT. Immediate corrective actions included insulating the diode butt splice to prevent a repeat electrical short. The relay assembly was subsequently replaced and a new diode that did not have a butt splice was installed. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action request 1880888. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Significance Determination Process Initial Characterization of Findings Table 2 dated June 19, 2012; the finding was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, was used to further evaluate this finding. The finding required a detailed risk evaluation by an NRC senior reactor analyst due to an actual loss of function of at least a single Train for greater than its TS AOT. The analyst determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., Green). The dominant accident sequence was a loss of offsite power followed by a series of electrical failures leading to station blackout and ultimately a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident and core damage. The remaining mitigation of such an accident was comprised of the Unit 1 EDGs and recovery of power from the opposite unit. This finding was associated with a cross cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area because the licensee had not provided complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures and work packages to ensure that the EDG wiring butt splice was insulated in accordance with plant specifications during maintenance activities in May 2008 and again in September 2012 H.2(c). |
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000335/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera-Ortiz J Hanna T Morrissey J Reyes G Kolcum A Sengupta M Riches P Carman |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
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