05000335/FIN-2013002-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Ensure Reactor Auxiliary Building Penetrations Were Adequately Flood Protected |
Description | An NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to ensure that all below grade Unit 1 and 2 reactor auxiliary building (RAB) penetrations were adequately sealed as required by the licensees design basis. The missing and degraded penetration seals were found during licensee inspections performed in response to a letter from the NRC to licensees, entitled Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340). Corrective actions completed included restoring the degraded or missing seals to design basis requirements. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to affect an external event mitigation system and affected the mitigating system cornerstone. Although the finding existed with the units at power and during shutdown conditions since original plant construction, the risk was assessed using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1 Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for both PWRs and BWRs dated May 25, 2004 using Checklists 1 through 4. Appendix G was utilized since both units would have been shutdown prior to the probable maximum hurricane (PMH) event and associated external flood. Due to the accuracy of weather forecasting, there would be several days for the licensee to prepare for a PMH. The inspectors reviewed the finding with the regional senior reactor analyst and determined that the licensee would have adequate time to ensure that the mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, emergency AC power, containment control, or reactivity control systems would have been available prior to the PMH affecting the site. The finding screened as Green because none of the attributes in the checklists were adversely impacted. No cross cutting aspects were assigned to the finding. The finding does not represent current licensee performance because the degraded and missing penetration seals have existed since original construction of the plant. |
Site: | Saint Lucie |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000335/2013002 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | W Loo R Reyes T Morrissey T Hoeg M Speck D Rich S Sandal |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.54 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control 10 CFR 50.54(f) |
INPO aspect | |
' | |
Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||