05000335/FIN-2012007-06
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 of CFR Part 50, Appendix B Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this, in 1999, the licensee documented (CR 99-1278) that the hot leg injection (HLI) methodology was not single failure proof, because a loss of an electrical bus would prevent both the primary and alternative HLI flow paths from being successful. The primary HLI injection flow path uses motor operated valves (MOVs), normally closed, fail-as-is, that are powered from train A and train B VAC buses. The alternate flow path uses solenoid operated valves that are powered by 125 VDC battery bus A and B. Valves in each HLI flow path are powered from the opposite train so that loss of electric power to train A or train B would render both flow paths inoperable. In 1999, the licensee determined that a HLI flow path could be restored by use of temporary jumpers to restore power to the MOVs affected by the loss of an electrical train. However, HLI procedures were not revised and were not fabricated at that time. In 2008, CR 2008-35069, documented that the previously identified jumpers and procedure changes were not implemented. CR 2008- 35069 developed new tracking actions for the required procedure changes and jumper fabrication. Subsequently, in 2011, the licensee identified that the procedure changes and jumper fabrication identified in the 1999 and 2008 CRs still had not been implemented. Currently the licensee has fabricated the required jumpers and procedure changes have been implemented thus restoring compliance. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of the LPSI system to perform HLI, a required long term cooling safety function. The finding was evaluated in Phase 1 and determined to require a Phase 3 analysis due to the loss of system safety function. The condition was evaluated by a Regional SRA and determined to have very low safety significance (Green) based on the low likelihood of a large break LOCA and low likelihood of electrical failures requiring jumpers to be installed. This issue and corrective actions were documented in the licensees corrective action program as Action Request (AR) 1703137. |
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000335/2012007 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Hopper J Reyes J Sowa R Ng R Taylor T Chandler T Morrissey |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2012007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
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