05000334/FIN-2012007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | License Condition 2.F for Unit 2 requires FENOC to implement and maintain the fire protection program as approved in the Safety Evaluation Reports. UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Revision 14, states, in part, The BVPS-2 fire suppression system is capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within reach of areas containing safety related equipment required for safe shutdown following a safe shutdown earthquake. Supplement 5 to NUREG-1057, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, documented the review of Amendment 14 of the FSAR. Contrary to the above, in the year 2000, BVPS abandoned the booster pump which provided the seismic water supply to the standpipe system feeding the areas containing safety-related equipment. This condition was identified by the FENOC NFPA 805 Project Team in 2006. At that time, a procedure was developed to align a 6-inch bypass line around the abandoned booster pump to provide water from the River Water System to the standpipe system in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). FENOC did not perform an evaluation at that time to determine the capability of the line to provide adequate water pressure and flow to ensure effective hose streams for firefighting purposes. In response to questions from the team, FENOC performed an informal, undocumented calculation which determined that the 6-inch bypass line would not provide sufficient flow and pressure to enable effective hose streams at normal river water system operating conditions. FENOC revised an operations standing order to direct operators to isolate unnecessary river water flow paths after an earthquake to raise river water system pressure to improve flow and pressure provided to the PAS standpipe system. This issue only pertains following a safe shutdown earthquake. The safety-related equipment is designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. Non safety-related equipment in proximity to safety-related equipment is also designed so that an earthquake will not cause it to fail in such a way that it will adversely impact safety related equipment. FENOC\\\'s seismic-fire interaction study indicates that while there may be some seismically induced fires following a safe shutdown earthquake, none will be in areas containing safety-related equipment. With this seismic 2 over 1 design, there will be no safety-related equipment damaged by a seismic induced fire, so delta CDF will be zero (Green). Since this issue is of very low safety significance and has been entered into FENOC\\\'s corrective action program as CR-2012-12265, it is being treated as a Green, licensee identified NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
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| Report | IR 05000334/2012007 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Cahill D Spindler J Rogge E Bonney |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2012007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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