05000331/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Work Instructions did not Include Reactivity Impact Evaluation for Preventive Maintenance Activity |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed when opening MO-1044 (main steam line drain orifice valve) to conduct preventive maintenance on its associated control breaker led to an unanticipated increase in core thermal power. Specifically, reactor core thermal power exceeded the facilitys maximum-licensed steady state power level [LPL] of 1912 megawatts thermal (MWth) during the conduct of model work order (WO) 1282557. Although the WO identified that opening MO-1044 had a reactivity impact; Form NG-008R, Reactivity Management Screening Checklist, was not performed which would have required a more rigorous consideration of the impact of the activity on current plant conditions and whether any compensatory measures were needed. Therefore, conservative actions to reduce reactor power prior to opening MO-1044 to preclude the temperature transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition were not taken by the operating crew. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 01643412, revised station procedures, and reviewed existing model WOs to ensure that the reactivity impact would be considered and evaluated prior to performance of the reactivity impacted activities. The inspectors determined that the issue was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor and a finding because the performance deficiency was sufficiently similar to Example 8.a of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Because the finding was only associated with the fuel barrier under the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) or Fuel Barrier Column, the finding screened as Green. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency affected the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work control components, and involving aspects associated with appropriately planning work activities by incorporating compensatory actions. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2011003 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Munir K Riemer D Jones L Haeg R Murray A Scarbeary |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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