05000324/LER-2004-001, Inoperability of High Pressure Coolant Injection During Maintenance Activity
| ML042390463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/2004 |
| From: | Hinds D Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BSEPP 04-0096 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML042390463 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
| 3242004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
C4 Progress Energy AUG 19 2004 SERIAL: BSEP 04-0096 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-324/License No. DPR-62 Licensee Event Report 2-04-001 Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Power
& Light Company, now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within sixty (60) days of a reportable occurrence.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Edward T. O'Neil, Manager - Support Services, at (910) 457-3512.
Sincerely, David H. Hinds Plant General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant GLM/glm Enclosure: Licensee Event Report Progress Energy Carolinas. Inc.
0 Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461
Document Control Desk BSEP 04-0096 / Page 2 cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Dr. William D. Travers, Regional Administrator Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Eugene M. DiPaolo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Brenda L. Mozafari (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. Jo A. Sanford Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commnission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
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_ spc 11Dtte ilaonl onacto PAGE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit 2 05000324 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Inoperability of High Pressure Coolant Injection During Maintenance Activity
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE S. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MO DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REV MO DAY YEAR FAIUTY NAME DOCKETNUMBER NUMBER NO 05000 FACUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 22 2004 2004 -
001 00 08 19 2004 S.
OPERATING
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR i: (Check one or more)
MODE I
I 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(fi)(B)
I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(a)(4) 0
.73(a)(2)()
i0.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL 96
_ 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(C)(1)()(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 7 13.71 (a)(4) 202203(a)(2)(i) 0.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
S In Abstrctbelow or 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2) (i)(A)
X 50.73(a) (2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2) (viii)(A)
L 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME Gary L. Miller, Lead Engineer I TLPMUNO NUMBER (include Area Moae)
(910) 457-2110 I
On June 21, 2004, Unit 2 was operating at 96 percent of rated thermal power with all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System operable. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System surveillance test 2MST-HPCI28R, "HPCI Reactor High Water Level Channel Calibration and Functional Test," was being performed as a planned maintenance test. During performance of the test, an instrument channel was found out of calibration. Maintenance activities to restore the instrument channel were not completed when the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit was reached in the Technical Specifications Required Action, requiring the HPCI system to be declared inoperable on June 22, 2004, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />. The instrument channel was subsequently restored and BPCI was returned to operable status on June 22, 2004, at 1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br />.
The safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal because HPCI was available for injection with operator action, and adequate core cooling was ensured by the operability of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System. Also, the RCIC system would automatically provide makeup water at high reactor operating pressures. The cause of the maintenance activity exceeding the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TS required action was failure to establish an effective maintenance plan.
NRC FORM 366 (72001)
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EVENT CAUSE
Plant personnel failed to establish an effective maintenance plan for restoring the HPCI instrument channel to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, thus requiring the HPCI system to be declared inoperable. The cause of the event was personnel error due to ineffective supervision and oversight of the maintenance activities. A contributing cause was the mindset that existed relative to previous failures of trip units and transmitters that biased the troubleshooting, contingency planning, and repair.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1.
Maintenance activities and post maintenance testing were completed at 1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br /> on June 22, 2004, allowing the HPCI system to be restored to operable status.
- 2.
To prevent recurrence, the Maintenance Supervisor Conduct of Maintenance, procedure OJO-02, will be revised to include a detailed action plan, including contingency planning, and resource allocation.
- 3.
Maintenance supervisors have received training on this event with respect to management expectations that will be reinforced in the revision to procedure OJO-02.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of reportable events for the past three years did not identify previous similar events. On occasions in the past, level transmitter trip units similar to the one in this event have experienced random failures or have been found to be out of calibration; however, the maintenance activities to restore function did not exceed TS completion times.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal because HPCI was available for injection with operator action, and adequate core cooling was ensured by the operability of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System. Also, the RCIC system would automatically provide makeup water at high reactor operating pressures.
COMMITMENTS
Those actions committed to by Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC) in this document are identified below.
Any other actions discussed in this submittal represent intended or planned actions by PEC. They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager -
Support Services at BSEP of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory
commitments
The Maintenance Supervisor Conduct of Maintenance procedure OJO-02 will be revised to include a detailed action plan, including contingency planning, and resource allocation. This will be complete by February 15, 2005.