05000321/LER-2005-003, Discrepancy in Special Nuclear Material Inventory
| ML053430272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/2005 |
| From: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-05-2262 LER 05-003-00 | |
| Download: ML053430272 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3212005003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President Hatch Project December 9, 2005 Docket No.:
50-321 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Post Off~ce Box 1295 B~rmingham. Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7279
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SOUTHERN &
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COMPANY Energy to Serve Your WorldSM U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report Discrepancv in Special Nuclear Material Inventory Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(l), and in accordance with the procedures described in 10CFR50.73(b), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed follow-up report on a discrepancy in special nuclear material inventory using the Licensee Event Report format and content as specified in 10 CFR 20.220 1 (b)(2)(i).
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.
Sincerely, H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Enclosure: LER 1-2005-003 cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasset, Executive Vice President Mr. G. R. Frederick, General Manager - Plant Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. C. Gratton, NRR Project Manager - Hatch Mr. D. S. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digitstcharacters for each block) it was determined that a discrepancy existed between the amount of spent fuel that exists in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and the amount recorded within the SNM physical inventory records. This was reported as NRC Event 42 135 on November 10, 2005 pursuant to 10CFR20.2201(a)(l)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) believes the SNM in question, consisting of fuel rod segmentslfragments from five (5) fuel rods, and some pellets from a sixth rod, are either in an area of the SFPs that have not yet been inspected or were mistakenly shipped to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material. The possibility of theft or diversion is not considered plausible because of the plant's radiation monitoring instrumentation, physical security measures, and the size and type of container required for transporting nuclear material of this nature. From a material accounting and control perspective, Plant Hatch did not maintain accountability of these fuel segmentslfragments from five (5) fuel rods that broke during the fuel reconstitution and inspection activities in the early 1980s. Additionally, a sixth broken rod has some missing pellets or pellet fragments.
This event was most likely caused by fuel rod segmentslfragments not being tracked as separate, individual items in the SNM inventory. The applicable plant procedure has been revised to prevent this problem from recurring.
Inventory verification activities in response to the NRC Bulletin continue. A root cause investigation is underway.
NRC FORM 366 (1-2001) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION 11
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
II FACILITY NAME (1)
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes appear in the text as (EIIS Code XX).
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
At approximately 1528 EST, on November 10, 2005, with Unit 1 in Mode 4, a notification was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of a Special Nuclear Material (SNM) accounting discrepancy. This was a non-emergency event notification, made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(l)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), to inform the NRC of an SNM accounting discrepancy. The discrepancy is believed to be segments of five (5) rods from five (5) fuel bundleslassemblies, amounting to, in the aggregate, less than one spent fuel rod. Additionally, a sixth broken rod has some missing fuel pellets or pellet fragments. In the process of reviewing records and physically verifying the contents of the Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs) as part of activities associated with corrective action [Condition Report 2005 105 1771 and preparing Southern Nuclear Operating Company's (SNC) response to NRC Bulletin 2005-01, material control and accounting discrepancies related to fuel segrnentslfragments located in the SFP and physical inventories records were identified. The Spent Fuel Pool Item Control Area (ICA) includes both spent fuel pools for Units 1 & 2. Based on record reviews, the segrnentslfragments are believed to have originated during fuel reconstitution and inspection activities during the early 1980s. Previous physical inventory procedures performed at the plant did not track individual fuel segrnentslfragments that were separate from fuel bundles.
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (1 7 )
DOCKET 05000-32 1 It is believed that the fuel segrnentslfragments still reside within the SFP or were mistakenly shipped to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material. Physical searches of the SFPs in Summer, 2005 and Fall, 2005 identified individual segments in the SFPs separate from their original bundles. Retrieval of several potential short segments and/or pellet fragments, including at least one 5 inch segment, is ongoing. Inventory verification in response to the NRC Bulletin is in progress. A root cause investigation is underway.
10 CFR 20.2201(b) requires a written report within 30 days after the initial notification for the occurrence of any lost, stolen, or missing licensed material that was reported under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(l)(ii) for licensed material in a quantity 10 times greater that the quantity specified in Appendix C to Part 20. The following topics are required to be addressed:
LER NUMBER (6) 11 (i) A description of the licensed material involved, including kind, quantity, and chemical and physical form:
II YEAR Segmentslfragments of irradiated fuel rods, approximately '/z inch in diameter, consisting of fuel pellets and pellets contained within metal cladding. The fuel material is irradiated, low-enrichment uranium dioxide.
(ii) A description of the circumstances under which the loss or theft occurred:
Fuel rods were broken during inspection and reconstitution activities in the early 1980s. The location of the resulting segrnentslfragments was not recorded in the SNM inventory records. The possibility of theft or diversion is not plausible because of the plant's radiation monitoring instrumentation, physical security measures, and the size and type of container required for transporting nuclear material of this nature. It is believed that the fuel fragments either still reside within the SFPs or they were mistakenly shipped to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material.
2005
-- 003 -- 00 SEQUENTIAL YEAR REVISION NUMBER U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 TEXT ( I f more space 1s required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (1 7)
(iii)A statement of disposition, probable disposition, of the licenses material involved:
A final statement of disposition is not available at this time; further evaluations are ongoing. However, it is believed that the fuel segmentslfragments either still reside within the SFP or they were mistakenly shipped to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material. A final disposition or probable disposition will be determined through the use of the root cause investigation which will be completed in early 2006.
(iv) Exposures of individuals to radiation, circumstances under which the exposures occurred, and the possible total effective dose equivalent to persons in unrestricted areas:
No exposure to radiation occurred to the plant staff or members of the public, since the fuel segmentslfragments either remain in the SFPs or were mistakenly shipped in a licensed protective container to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material. This facility possesses monitoring equipment to prevent unauthorized exposure.
(v) Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material:
The location of the fuel segmentslfragments has yet to be determined. A root cause investigation is underway.
A team is currently completing a detailed physical inspection of the SFPs, collecting records, performing document reviews, and interviewing present and former employees and vendors who have been associated with SFP activities, irradiated fuel inspections and reconstitutions, and radioactive material shipments at Plant Hatch.
The following specific actions have been performed or are in progress:
(1) Visual inspection of accessible areas of the Spent Fuel Pool is almost complete. Special cameras and robotic equipment are being used to perform this inspection.
(2) Additional review of selected vendor fuel and shipping records is in progress.
(3) Additional review of selected SNC fuel and shippinglreceipt records is in progress.
(4) Lnspection of selected fuel assemblies in the SFP is in progress.
(5) Records are being reviewed to identify any information which might be pertinent to the on-site investigation.
(6) The number of fuel bundles/assemblies within the SFP has been verified.
(7) The records of offsite shipments are being reviewed to determine if any fragments were sent directly to off-site locations for analysis or testing.
(9) Inspection of selected cells and accessible areas in, around, and under fuel storage racks is in progress.
(10) Inspection of baskets, pails, and other containers within the SFP is in progress.
(1 1) Inspection of open spaces and locations under equipment stored on the bottom of the SFP is in progress to ensure all areas are inspected.
(12) State of Georgia and South Carolina representatives and the operator of the Barnwell facility were notified of the discrepancy.
(vi) Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:
Corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this event will be developed through the root cause investigation process. Additionally, plant procedure 42FH-ENG-030-0, "Special Nuclear Material Inventory & Transfer Control," has been revised. The procedure now establishes requirements that will ensure that the storage and inventory of individual fuel rods, fuel rod pieces, and other SNM fuel fragments will be properly documented and accounted for in the plant's physical inventories. DOCKET 05000-32 1 LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE 3 YEAR YEAR NUMBER 2005
-- 003 -- 00 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUA-1-ION I
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 11 05000-321 11 2005 '--
003 --' 00 11 4 OF 5 FAClLlN NAME (1)
I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (1 7 )
CAUSE OF EVENT
This event was apparently caused by fuel rod segrnentslfragments not being tracked as separate items on the SNM inventory when segrnentslfragments could not be returned to their bundles from which they originated during reconstitution and inspection activities. A supplement to this LER will be issued to provide this information when the root cause investigation has been completed.
DOCKET REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT YEAR I
LER NUMBER (6)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER This report is required by 10 CFR 20.2201 (b) because of a nuclear material accountability discrepancy. Portions of five (5) spent fuel rods, amounting to less than a fuel rod in the aggregate, were not located as part of the SNM inventory performed in response to Bulletin 2005-01. Additionally, a sixth broken rod has some missing pellets or pellet fragments. The discrepancy involved segmentslfragments of irradiated fuel rods, approximately Y2 inch in diameter, consisting of fuel pellets and pellets contained within metal cladding. The fuel material is irradiated, low-enrichment uranium dioxide.
The possibility of theft or diversion is not plausible because of radiation monitoring instrumentation, the plant's physical security measures, and the size and type of container required for transporting nuclear material of this nature.
No exposure to radiation occurred to plant staff or to the public, since the fuel fragments either remain in the SFPs or were mistakenly shipped in a licensed protective container to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material, which possesses monitoring equipment to prevent unauthorized exposure.
A final statement of disposition is not available at this time. However, it is believed that the fuel segmentslfragments either still reside within the SFP or they were mistakenly shipped to a facility licensed to receive radioactive waste material. A final disposition or probable disposition will be determined through the use of the root cause investigation methodology. This disposition should be available in early 2006.
Based upon the preceding analysis, it is concluded this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. The analysis is applicable to all power levels.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Procedure 42FH-ENG-030-0, "Special Nuclear Material Inventory & Transfer Control" has been revised. The procedure now establishes requirements that will ensure that the storage and inventory of individual fuel rods, fuel rod pieces, and other SNM fuel part fragments will be properly documented and accounted for in the plant's inventory.
Procedure 62RP-RAD-055-0, "Underwater Storage and Inventory of Radioactive Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool" was developed as a response to industry events and to increase SFP inventory control and to ensure valid item location.
Additional corrective actions will be completed based on the results from the root cause investigation. A supplement to this LER will be issued to provide these corrective actions when the root cause investigation has been completed.
I1 11 NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1 LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3 YEAR YEAR NUMBER Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000-32 1 2005
-- 003 -- 00 5 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ( 1 7)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
No systems other than those already mentioned in this report were affected by this event.
This LER does not contain any permanent licensing commitments.
LER 50-32111982-097, dated November 30, 1982, reported the separation of a fuel rod into two (2) segmentslfragments during fuel rod inspection.
NRC Inspection Report 50-321188-10, dated April 27, 1988, addressed material accountability and control procedures at Plant Hatch. NRC Inspection Report 50-321187-27, dated November 18, 1987, includes an NRC finding related to material control and accountability. NRC Inspection Report 50-321183-3 1, dated December 9, 1983, includes NRC observations of fuel bundle reconstitution activities.
A supplement to this LER will be issued in early 2006 to provide this final disposition when the root cause investigation has been completed.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I'