05000317/FIN-2014004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Main Steam Line Drain Containment Isolation Valves not Scoped in In-Service Testing |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, Codes and Standards, for Exelons failure to meet the test requirements set forth in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) for main steam line drains (MSLDs) and containment isolation valves (CIVs) motor operated valves (MOVs) (6611, 6612, 6613, 6615, 6620, 6621). Specifically, Exelon failed to scope the MSLD MOVs in their in-service testing (IST) program. As a result, the MOVs reliability was not ensured due to valve degradation not being trended as required in the IST program. Also, the MOV operability was in question because the valves were never tested to perform their containment isolation function. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-2014-005961. Immediate corrective actions included testing the MOVs. The inspectors determined that the failure to scope and meet the testing requirements of the OM Code for MSLD MOVs in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system (RCS), and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to scope and test the MSLD MOVs in accordance with the OM Code did not ensure component reliability by monitoring valve degradation and did not provide assurance that the MSLD MOVs would perform their CIV function in order to protect the public from radionuclides releases during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with a loss of offsite power event. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions issued June 19, 2012, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components and the finding did not involve an actual reduction of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency was not reflective of current licensee performance. Specifically, the 2007 IST fourth year interval submittal was the last reasonable opportunity for Exelon to identify this issue. |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
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| Report | IR 05000317/2014004 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook B Fuller D Schroeder E Burket E Torres G Callaway J Nicholson P Presby R Clagg S Stewart |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.55a |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2014004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
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