05000317/FIN-2012003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish and Maintain Adequate Procedures for Maintenance on Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1, Administrative Controls Procedures, was identified for the failure to establish and maintain adequate procedures for performing maintenance on pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs). Specifically, the maintenance procedure (purchase order) did not clearly prescribe acceptance criteria for the minimum acceptable clearances between the cage, guide, and the main disc. This resulted in the as left internal valves clearances being less than the minimum expected requirements. During disassembly, the valve disc of one of the PORVs (serial number BS07325) was stuck and had to be mechanically removed. Immediate corrective actions included entering this issue into the CAP, conducting an OD for the valves currently installed on both units, and conducting a past operability review of the PORVs that were removed. Planned corrective actions include updating the design specification and maintenance procedures to ensure that minimum allowable internal clearances are specified. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, when the valve was removed and disassembled, the valve disc was found stuck and had to be mechanically removed, thereby impacting the reliability and operability of the valve during operation at power the previous cycle. A detailed engineering analysis was performed which supported past operability of the valve. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because personnel work practices did not support human performance. Specifically, Constellation did not ensure supervisory and management of oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. Critical dimensions affecting contractor work activities were not adequately captured in station processes, procedures, and work packages. |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000317/2012003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Kaufman G Dentel S Kennedy D Dodson E Torres P Mckenna |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2012Q2
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