05000317/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation did not establish an operational test program for the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) shutdown sequencers (SDSs). Specifically, on May 4, 2012, the inspectors determined that the licensee had never performed an operational test on the SDSs. The SDS supports the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) event in chapter 14 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Constellations immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into their corrective action program (CAP), conducting an operability determination (OD), developing a procedure to test the SDSs online, and testing the SDSs. Planned corrective actions include submittal of a license amendment request to include the SDS testing in their technical specification (TS) requirements. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, when tested, one of the SDSs did not perform as designed. The SDS logic for the No. 24 4kV bus initiated start of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump on the incorrect step. In addition, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more safety significant concern, in that, an SDS failure would go undetected until an actual demand during an LOOP. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, CAP, because Constellation did not identify this issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance. Specifically, within the last 3 years, Constellation had several opportunities to completely and accurately identify the SDS test program deficiency as a result of multiple sequencer module replacements and through reviews of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) testing program |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000317/2012003 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Kaufman G Dentel S Kennedy D Dodson E Torres P Mckenna |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2012Q2
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