05000315/FIN-2006007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation to Remove Design Basis Requirement from UFSAR |
| Description | The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 because the licensee failed to perform an adequate safety evaluation review as required by 10 CFR 50.59 for changes made to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). In 10 CFR 50.59 Screen No. 2006-0041, Replace Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Closure Head (1-OME-1), Revision 0, the licensee evaluated an UFSAR change that removed the emergency load condition specified in UFSAR Tables 2.9-1 and 2.9-2. Within the 10 CFR 50.59 screen, the licensee failed to identify that the proposed activity involved revising or replacing an UFSAR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases. As a result, a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for the UFSAR change was not performed. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program (AR 00803398 and AR 00803828). The finding was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors, at the time of the inspection, could not reasonably determine that the UFSAR change, which adversely affected equipment important to safety, would not have ultimately required NRC approval. Because the issue affected the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function, this finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. However, where possible, the underlying technical issue is evaluated under the Significance Determination Process (SDP) to determine the severity of the violation. In this case, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, because the inspectors answered no to LOCA initiators question 1 under the Initiating Events Cornerstone column of the Phase 1 worksheet. Specifically, since the licensee had evaluated the faulted loading condition as part of the design basis for the replacement reactor vessel closure head, the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency that was confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality per Part 9900 Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment. Therefore, the finding would not have likely affected other mitigating systems resulting is a total loss of their safety function. |
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2006007 Section 1R02 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2006 (2006Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.02 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg T Bilik W Slawinski B Kemker M Phalen A Garmore J Lennartz J Neurauter R Walton |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2006007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2006Q4
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