05000315/FIN-2006501-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information to the NRC Which Impacted a Licensing Decision |
| Description | The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Title 10, Part 50, Section 54(q) of the Code of Federal Regulations states in-part, the nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to this part.\\\\\\\" Title10, Part 50, Section 47(b)(4) of the Code of Federal Regulations states in part, \\\\\\\"a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee. The licensee made and implemented a change to its emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) scheme on April 16, 2003, which appeared to decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without prior NRC approval. Specifically, the licensee changed the EAL to remove the condition, release of secondary coolant from the associated steam generator to the environment is occurring, from the Fission Product Barrier Matrix EAL for a loss of containment barrier due to a steam generator secondary side release. The revised emergency action level, secondary line break outside containment results in release (greater than 30 minutes) to the environment, added a non-conservative 30 minutes before meeting this emergency action level. There is a potential that a release condition could have existed which would not have been declared, resulting in either no action or delayed action by off-site authorities when measures to protect the health and safety of the public were warranted. In a previous 1995 correspondence between the NRC and the licensee concerning a proposal to revise the licensees EALs, the licensee proposed to implement a similar change to its EALs; however, the NRC specifically provided a written response to the licensee which indicated that a revision to the EAL which included a 30 minute criteria was unacceptable. The apparent violation was considered to be more than minor because the licensee made changes to the emergency plan and procedures that decreased the effectiveness of the plan without prior approval of the NRC. Because this apparent violation affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. There were no actual emergency events associated with this EAL during the time the change was in effect; however, the failure of the licensee to meet an emergency planning standard involving assessment does have regulatory significance. (Section 1EP4) |
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2006501 Section 1EP4 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2006 (2006Q3) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level III |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71114.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer R Jicklingc Pedersonk O'Brien M Satorius P Pelke R Caldwell |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000315/2006501 | |||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2006Q3
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