05000311/LER-1981-082, Forwards LER 81-082/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-082/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20010E708
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/1981
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20010E709 List:
References
NUDOCS 8109080181
Download: ML20010E708 (3)


LER-1981-082, Forwards LER 81-082/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111981082R00 - NRC Website

text

e e, CA O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gt s Company P.O. Box 168 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 26, 1Fdl Mr. Boyce,H. Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avanue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-82/99X Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-82/99X.

This report is required within ninety (90) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l

l lW bA H.

J. Midura Manager -

Salem Generating Station i

CC:

R.

A. Uderitz General Manager - Nuclear Production l

Director, Office of Inspe7 tion M., I r g

_gp IV' and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office ot Management ~

I Information and Program Cont.

  1. I (3 copies)

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Report Number:

81-02/99X Report Date:

8-26-81 Occurrence Date:

6-3-81 and 6-27-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Inadvertent Safety Injections Following Reactor Trips.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports81-171 and 81-220.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

6-03-81 Mode 1 - Rx Power 20% - Unit Load 111 MWe 6-27-81 Mode 1 - Rx Power 30% - Unit Load 260 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCUR' :NCE:

At 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br />, June 3, 1981, and again at 0403 hours0.00466 days <br />0.112 hours <br />6.66336e-4 weeks <br />1.533415e-4 months <br />, June 27, 1981, an inadvertent safety injection (SI) occurred following a turbine / reactor trip.

On both occurrence dates the inadvertent sis were initiated by high steam line flow coincidence with low reactor cc'.lant average tem-perature.

In both cases the emergency procedure for SI initiation was implemented and followed.

The sis were determined to be inadvertent and the SI signal was reset and the injection transients vere terminated in accordance with procedures and the unit was placed in a stable con-dition.

The duration of the injections were approximately 5 minutes on Junc 3, 1981, and 10 minutes on June 27, 1981.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Procedure inadequacy.

The inadvertent-sis were.the result of higher than normal steam flow demand oscillations caused by No. 23 auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP).

Testing on June 27, 1981, revealed that the No. 23 AFP when started ran erratic with wide variation in pump speed.

The hunting of the pump was discovered to be severe enough to cause steam flow spiking on No. 21 and No. 23 steam generators.

The high steam line flow conditions were set up by the combined effects of the steam demand by the Steam Dump System and the oscillations in the speed and hence steam demand of the No. 23 AFP.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

All safeguards equipment functioned as designed when the safety injec-tions were initiated.

The unit was designed for 50 safety injections.

So far to date we have had 3 safety injections transients which were of less severity than the design basis transient, therefore, the transients had no detrimental effect on the unit and operation may continue safely.

LER 81-82/99X,

CORRECTIVE ACTION

During the testing on June 27, 1981, it was discovered that by venting l

the auxiliary feedwater pump governor each time the pump is removed from service, by cycling the governor from minimum to maximum speed 3 times,.the pump tiill operate properly and function without speed oscillations and steam demand spiking.

The procedures for Unit 1 and 2 have been revised to incorporate this method auxiliary feedwater pump operation.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R.

MacWatters

//9, Dtd.[4w Manager - Saldm Gederating Station SORC Meeting No.

81-82

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