05000311/LER-1981-053, Forwards LER 81-053/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-053/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20010A476
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1981
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20010A477 List:
References
NUDOCS 8108110462
Download: ML20010A476 (3)


LER-1981-053, Forwards LER 81-053/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111981053R00 - NRC Website

text

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' O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 July 31, 1981 SI[{ -

Mr. Boyce H. Grier g-i g

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Director of USNRC 6

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f[-/, N U/Li Office of Inspection and Enforcement

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631 Park Avenue

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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 C),>

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Dear Mr. Grier:

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- to LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NJ. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-53/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-53/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

1. A. Uderit'z deneral Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

$ 61 l 8108110462 810731 gDRADOCK 05000311 PDR The Energy People 952001 (400M1181

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Report Number:

81-53/03L Report Date:

July 31, 1981 Occurrence Date:

7-1-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Missed Surveillance - Containmenu Air Lock.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 81-229.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mc3e 1 - Rx Power 30% - Unit Load 220 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On July 1, 1981, after a Unit 2 outage period in which both the inner and outer containment air lock doors were open, containment integrity was established without performing the surveillance procedure as reqaired by technical specification 4.6.1.3.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAU3E OF OCCURRENCE:

Personnel error.

The operators overlooked the surveillance requirement for Unit 2 containment air lock because it is new.

They didn't realize it was different than the requirement for Unit 1, which calls for a leakage test to be performed every 6 months.

The previous airlock test was well within that time period, having been satisfactorily performed on the 130' elevation air lock on April 13, 1981, and the 100' elevation air loch on April 30, 1981.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical specification 4.6.1.3.b requires:

Each containment air lock sha31 be demonstrated operable prior to establishing containment integrity, if opened when containment integrity was not required.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

When it was discovered that the Unit 2 containmert air locks had a new surveillance requirement, and it had been missed, the surveillance was completed immediately.

All personnel involved were counseled on the difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment air lock surveillance and their importance.

LER 81-53/03L 7/31/81 FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By,

F.

Dickey k *%

SORC Meeting No. _ 81-69