05000311/LER-1981-045, Forwards LER 81-045/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-045/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20030A873
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/21/1981
From:	Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20030A875	List: 05000311/LER-1981-045, Forwards LER 81-045/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000311/LER-1981-045-99, /99X-0:on 810423,inadvertent Safety Injection Occurred During Unit Cooldown.Caused by Personnel Error in Decreasing Automatic Setpoint.Personnel Counseled on Requirements to Follow Procedures
References
NUDOCS 8107290131
Download: ML20030A873 (3)

LER-1981-045, Forwards LER 81-045/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111981045R00 - NRC Website

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'1 Mr. Boyce H.

Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement

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Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-45/99X Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-45/99X.

This report is required within ninety (90) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

(. /[ 4 b"

A.

Uderitz General Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

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8107290131 810721

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PDR ADCCK 05000311 UI l

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' Report Number:

81-45/99X Report Date:

July 21, 1981 Occurrence Date:

4-23-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & bas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Inadvertent Safety Injection During Unit Cooldown.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 81-193.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3 - Rx Power 0% - 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br />, April 23, 1981, an inadvertent safety injection (SI) occurred during unit cooldown to mode 5.

The unit was being cooled down to repair an unisolable leak on the Chemical and Volume Con'.rol System (CVCS) charging line.

During the cooldown the steam generator atmospheric relief valves were being used to control the cooldown rate.

As the cooldown rate decreased, the automatic set point for 24MS10 was decreased too low and the controller responded by opening 24MS10 far enough to cause 24 steam generator pressure to decrease to less than the set poinc (100 psi) for steam line differential SI initiation.

The controller for 24MS10 was placed in manual control and 24MS10 was closed.

I'Te emergency procedure for SI initiation was implemented and followed.

The SI was determined to be inadvertent and the SI signal was reset and the injection transient was termi-nated in accordance with procedures.

At 0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br /> the unit was in a stable condition.

The total duration of the injection was 5 minutes.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Personnel error.

The automatic set point for 24MS10 was decreased too low causing the controller to open 24MS10 far enough to drop 24 steem generator pressure to the SI initiation set point.

I ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the safety injection was personnel error.

All safe-guard equipment functioned as designed when the safety injection was initiated.

The unit was designed for 50 safety injection transients.

So far to date we have had 1 safety injection transient which was of less severity than the design basis transient, therefore the transient had no detrimental effect on the unit and operation may continue safely.

,LER 81-45/99X July 21, 1981

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Personnel were counseled on the requirements, stated by procedures, to closely monitor the atmospheric relief valves and steam generator differential pressures if the cooldown of the unit is being controlled by use of the MS10s ir. order to prevent inadvertent sis on steam generator different'_al pressures.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By J.

J.

Espey

/

tt Manager - Saled Geherating Station SORC Meeting No.

81-63