The team identified a non-cited violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2., for failure to protect cables from fire damage for components required for
safe shutdown. Specifically, the Mecatiss MTS-3
fire wrap installed around the cables for valve DHV-42 (suction from the reactor building
sump to the Train A decay heat pump) was not installed in accordance with the vendors tested configuration. The licensee initiated a nuclear condition report and implemented an hourly roving
fire watch to address this issue. Additionally, the licensee implemented repairs during the March 2008 forced outage to upgrade the Mecatiss MTS-3
fire wrap to comply with the vendor tested configuration. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the external factors attribute, i.e., fire, and it degraded the reactor safety
Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Step 1.3, Qualitative Screening Approach, and concluded that the finding, when given credit for the fixed automatic suppression system in the area, was of very low safety significance (Green)
