05000301/FIN-2016001-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Electrical Safety Procedures Results in Plant Transient |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the licensees failure to follow electrical safety procedures when hanging danger tags on electrical components with exposed conductors. Specifically, danger tags were attached directly to the exposed energized portion of switchgear test switches, which exposed employees to an electrical hazard and contributed to the lockout of the 2X-01 main transformers and the subsequent Unit 2 plant transient. The licensees corrective actions included a change to tagging procedures to include specific direction for tagging knife switches. The proposed changes included a prohibition for hanging tags on metal parts of the switches, and installing robust operational barriers using tags plus devices when danger tags are to be utilized. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to use insulated tools on exposed electrical equipment greater than 50 volts presented an electrical injury hazard and actually resulted in a plant transient for Unit 2, which included lifting of a pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV), loss of forced reactor coolant system (RCS) flow, and actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, because Unit 2 was in mode 3 at the time of the event. Additionally, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012 applied. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to the Transient Initiators screening question. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Resources (H.1), in the area of Human Performance for failing to ensure that personnel, equipment procedures and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that employees had all necessary tools, direction, and supervision to support successful work performance. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000301/2016001 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Oliver J Cameron J Draper J Rutkowski K Barclay L Alvaredo M Garza T Bilik V Meyers |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000301/2016001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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