05000266/FIN-2015003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Incomplete Functionality Assessment for Flooding in the Diesel Generator Building |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to follow procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments, Revision 19. Specifically, when the licensee identified that internal flood sources in the diesel generator building (DGB) were larger than the drain capacity, they failed to identify all affected structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The DGB contains predominately Train B emergency power systems; however, the fuel oil transfer pumps for the Train A emergency diesel generators are located in the southeast corner of the building. The licensee failed to assess the effects of flooding on the Train A fuel oil transfer pumps. The licensees corrective actions included the creation of an adverse condition monitoring plan, which implemented an hourly flood watch in the DGB when the fire pump was manually started. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor, because if left uncorrected, it would potentially result in a more safety significant issue. Specifically, the failure to evaluate the effects of flooding on all SSCs resulted in inadequate compensatory measures. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the significance determination process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. For the time period in question, May 17, 2015 to September 17, 2015, the inspectors reviewed the security door card reader reports and starting sump levels for the DGB and found that during times when the fire pumps were running, station personnel had toured the DGB at a frequency that would have identified flooding conditions before a loss of system function. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to the Mitigating Systems screening questions. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation (P.2), in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R), for failing to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2015003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Bartlett B Palagi D Oliver E Coffman J Cameron J Mancuso J Rutkowski K Barclay R Baker V Meyers |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2015003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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