05000286/FIN-2010003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Procedural Requirements for N-38 Component Classification for Preventative Maintenance Not Implemented |
Description | An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance was identified because Entergy personnel did not implement procedural requirements for component classification. Specifically, Entergy staff did not classify the N-38 neutron detector as a high critical component, contrary to the guidance provided in EN-DC-153, \\\"Preventative Maintenance (PM) Component Classification.\\\" As a result, N-38 was not included in the site power supply PM program in 2008 which contributed to the detector\\\'s low voltage power supply (LVPS) failure on September 15, 2009, due to age-related degradation, causing a safety system functional failure of N-38. The issue was entered into Entergy\\\'s corrective action program. The LVPS was replaced, an extent of condition was performed, and N-38 and other remote shutdown instrumentation were appropriately classified as high critical for preventative maintenance in accordance with site procedures. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the age-related failure of the power supply resulted in N-38 being inoperable for a period of time. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) evaluated the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, \\\"Fire Protection Significance Determination Process,\\\" and qualitatively determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance within the Decision Making component because Entergy personnel did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, to ensure safety was maintained, including obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews on safety significant decisions. Specifically, Entergy staff did not incorporate the procedural direction within EN-DC-153 to classify N-38 as a high-critical component. H.1(a) per IMC 0310]. |
Site: | Indian Point ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000286/2010003 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Caron D Molteni F Arner J Noggle K Young M Gray M Halter M Patel P Cataldo |
CCA | , |
INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2010003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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