05000282/LER-2009-007, Unanalyzed Condition Due to a Breached Fire Barrier
| ML093560425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/2009 |
| From: | Schimmel M Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-PI-09-132 LER 09-007-00 | |
| Download: ML093560425 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition |
| 2822009007R00 - NRC Website | |
text
/@ x ~ e l Energy8 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota December 21, 2009 L-PI-09-132 10 CFR 50.73 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 Docket 50-282 License No. DPR-42 LER 1-09-07, Unanalyzed Condition due to a Breached Fire Barrier Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM) herewith encloses Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-09-07. The LER describes a breached fire barrier that was identified. NSPM will supplement this LER after the causal evaluation of the as-found condition is complete.
Summary of Commitments This letter contains no new commitments and no changes to existing commitments.
Mark A. Schimmel Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc:
Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC Department of Commerce, State of Minnesota 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1 121
ENCLOSURE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-09-07 3 Pages Follow
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9 2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for requ~red number of d~g~tslcharacters for each block) 1 FACILITY NAME Pra~r~e Island Nuclear Generat~ng Plant Un~t 1 4 TITLE APPROVED BY OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 Estimated burden per response to comply wlth thls mandatory collectlon request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> Reported lessons learned are ~ncorporated Into the llcenslng process and fed back to Industry Send comments regarding burden estlmate to the Records and FOIA/Prlvacy S e ~ l c e Branch (T-5 F52), U S Nuclear Regulatory Comm~ss~on, Washlngton DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-ma11 to ~nfocollects@nrc gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnformatlon and Regulatory Affalrs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0066), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503 If a means used to lmpose an ~nformat~on collect~on does not dlsplay a currently valld OMB control number the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person IS not requlred to respond to, the lnformat~on collectlon
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000282
- 3. PAGE 1 of 3 Unanalyzed Cond~t~on due to a Breached F~re Barr~er 5 EVENT DATE MONTH 9
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THlS LER I I.
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check all that apply) 20 2201(b) 20 2203(a)(3)(1) 50 73(a)(2)(1)(C) 50 73(a)(2)(~11) 20 2201(d) 20 2203(a)(3)(11) 50 73(a)(2)(11)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(v111)(A) 20 2203(a)(I) 20 2203(a)(4) 50 73(a)(2)(11)(8) 50 73(a)(2)(v111)(B) 20 2203(a)(2)(1) 50 36(c)(l)(l)(A) 5 0 73(a)(2)(111) 50 73(a)(2)(lx)(A) 20 2203(a)(2)(11) 50 36(c)(l)(11)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(1v)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(x) 20 2203(a)(2)(111) 50 36(c)(2) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73 71 (a)(4) 20 2203(a)(2)(1v) 50 46(a)(3)(11) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(B) 7 3 71 (a)(5) 20 2203(a)(2)(v) 50 73(a)(2)(l)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER 20 2203(a)(2)(v1) 50 73(a)(2)(1)(8) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Spec~fy NRC Fp~p,
~n Abstract 366A below or ~n
- 9. OPERATING MODE Mode 5 10 POWER LEVEL 0%
DAY 13 YEAR NAME Kathryn Mews YEAR 2009
- 7. REPORT DATE TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 651 388.1 12 1, extens~on 7384 2009 - 007 - 00 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER MONTH 12
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED REV NO FACILITY NAME FACILITY NAME DAY 21 DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER
CAUSE
YEAR 2009 SYSTEM
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED O YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
0 NO COMPONENT ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I e, approximately 15 smgle-spaced typewntten lines)
On September 13, 2009, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, documented an apparent breach between the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 11 and 12 Battery Rooms The two Battery Rooms are separated by an eight inch concrete block wall that contalns a penetration seal. The penetration seal consists of a five-inch and one-inch conduit filled and sealed to form a f~re barrier The f~ve-inch conduit was breached to run temporary cable for maintenance work. An evaluation completed on October 28, 2009, concluded that the as-found condition was a breached fire barrier, such that the requlred degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains was lacking. Thus, this event is be~ng reported In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.
NSPM IS perform~ng a causal evaluation for this event. When the evaluation is complete, NSPM will submit a supplement to thls LER NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
MANU-FACTURER YEAR 201 0
- 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE REPORTABLE TO EPlX MONTH 3
DAY 20
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FA CTURER REPORTABLE TO EPlX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I) 11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 11 LER NUMBER (6)
TEXT (If more space 1s required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Battery Rooms 11 and 12 are separated by an eight-inch concrete block wall that contains a penetration seal. The penetration seal contains two conduits (a five-inch conduit and a one-inch conduit) that are filled and sealed to form a fire barrier. On September 13, 2009, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, documented the breach between the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 11 and 12 ~attery' Rooms.
The five-inch conduit was breached on September 3, 2009 to run temporary cable for maintenance between the two Battery Rooms. The conduit end caps and thermal insulating wool fill were removed. The temporary cable was run through the conduit which resulted in an unanalyzed fire barrier. On September 13, 2009, PlNGP documented the breach between the 1 1 and 12 Battery Rooms.
An evaluation of the as-found configuration completed on October 28, 2009, determined that the as-found configuration met the reportability requirement of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
EVENT ANALYSIS
The as-found configuration was a breached fire barrier, such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains was lacking, thus, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The PlNGP fire protection program requires compensatory measures be taken for missing or breached fire barriers (specifically, establish a fire patrol in the affected fire areas). A formal fire patrol was not established for the breached fire barrier. No actual loss of function occurred as a result of the as-found condition, thus the condition was not a safety system functional failure.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The concrete block wall forms a fire barrier with a three-hour rating. Fire detection equipment on both sides of the fire barrier was operable during the breach. Should a fire have occurred on either side of the fire barrier, it would have been detected in its early stages by the fire detection equipment. This would have initiated a prompt response by the PINGP fire brigade. It is considered that fire detection and plant response along with the as-found barriers would have mitigated the potential adverse effects to the redundant equipment. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public.
1 Ells System Code. El
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional cop~es of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CAUSE
NSPM is performing a causal evaluation for this event. When the evaluation is complete NSPM will submit a supplement to this LER.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Upon discovery, NSPM initiated hourly fire watches to patrol the five-inch fire penetration seal until the maintenance work was complete.
As part of the causal evaluation for this event, NSPM may identify additional corrective actions that will be included in the planned supplement to this LER.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of Licensee Event Reports for PlNGP since 2004 found one similar event where a fire barrier was found to have been breached without compensatory measures. The event was documented in LER 1-07-03 (Unanalyzed Condition due to Breached Fire Barrier).