05000282/FIN-2014005-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures during EDG 24 Hour Load Test |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, on September 29, 2014, due to the licensees failure to follow procedure during the performance of SP 1335, D2 Diesel Generator 18 Month 24 Hour Load Test. Specifically, operations personnel failed to comply with steps within SP 1335 which directed that the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) kVAR loading be adjusted until a power factor of less than or equal to 0.85 was achieved or Bus 16 voltage was between 4350 and 4375 volts. An extent of condition review determined that operations personnel failed to comply with a similar procedure step during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load test of the D1 EDG performed in May 2013. As a result, the licensee had to re-perform the tests, which resulted in additional EDG inoperability and unavailability. Corrective actions for this issue included training the operators on the need to maintain the power factor or bus voltage within limits during testing, requiring all data collected by the operations department during Technical Specification (TS) surveillance testing to be independently verified, and requiring all TS surveillance requirement results to be reviewed and approved by two senior reactor operators. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and impacted the cornerstones objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operations personnel were required to declare the D1 and D2 EDGs inoperable and unavailable to perform their safety functions while the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load testing was re-performed. The inspectors concluded that this issue was of very low safety significance because each question provided in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, was answered No. This finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Avoid Complacency area because operations personnel failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools to ensure that the power factor or bus voltage requirements were met during the surveillance test (H.12). |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2014005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Boston B Jose D Mcneil D Passehl J Beavers J Bozga K Riemer K Stoedter M Holmberg M Phalen P Laflamme R Elliott V Meghani |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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