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LER-2015-002, Regarding Driver Brought Contraband to Protected Area Sally Port
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
	2802015002R00 - NRC Website
	v • d • e

Regarding Driver Brought Contraband to Protected Area Sally Port
	ML15293A493
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/12/2015
From:	Lane N; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	15-477 LER 15-002-00
	Download: ML15293A493 (6)
	v • d • e

10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 October 12, 2015 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.:

SPS:

Docket No.:

License No.:

15-477 JSA 50-280 50-281 DRP-32 DRP-37 Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2015-002-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours, rxr r.

N. L. Lane Site Vice President Surry Power Station Enclosure Commitment contained in this letter: None

Serial No.15-477 Docket Nos: 50-280/50-281 Page 2 of 2 cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower, Suite 1200 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Director, Division of Security Policy

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Two White Flint North 11545 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014) o,.,",*,

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days 0.0222 hours 1.322751e-4 weeks 3.044e-5 months .

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and ted back to industry.

'*"*J Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and information Collections

" ICEN EE VENTREP RT (ER)

Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICE SEEEVE T rir'.iri (ER) internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resouroe@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnformation and CONTINUATION SHEET Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently~valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

13. PAGE Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000280[

1 OF4

4. TITLE Driver Brought Contraband to Protected Area Sally Port

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER I

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MOTH DA YER YA EUNIL RVlFCLT NAM DOCKTNME MN A EA E

NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY yEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 14 215 2015

- o00

- co 00 10 12 01o000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(.A)

N El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20,2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50,73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[] 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50,73(a)(2)(~v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On August 14, 2015 at approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months , with Surry Power Station (SPS) Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% power, the driver of a chemical delivery truck told a Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) Nuclear Security Officer, who was searching his vehicle at the entry to the protected area (PA), that he had portions of a disassembled weapon inside his backpack with the rest of the weapon inside his delivery truck.

Prior to entry into the station owner controlled area (OCA), the driver was stopped at the OCA checkpoint and asked if he was in possession of contraband (weapons, incendiary devices or explosives). The driver responded that he had no weapons in the truck and, after an initial search, was allowed to proceed to the entry of the PA for a second routine search. Once inside the vehicle sally port, the Security Officer noted that the driver had a cell phone and informed him that the cell phone was not authorized into the PA and his cell phone and backpack could be left inside the sally port gate box. The driver then told the Security Officer that he had a disassembled weapon inside his backpack and that the rest of the weapon was located inside of the delivery truck. A search identified the weapon slide and one magazine containing (10) 45 caliber rounds wrapped inside a towel within the backpack. The lower receiver and second magazine containing (10) 45 caliber rounds were located under clothing in the driver side of the truck's sleeping compartment. The truck driver was denied station PA access and he and the delivery truck were escorted off-site. The Security Officer noted that the driver was cooperative.

At 0850 hours0.00984 days 0.236 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.23425e-4 months on August 14, 2015, a one-hour notification was made to the NRC pursuant to 10OCFR73, Appendix G, item 1(d), for an attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area. This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR73.71(a)(4) for a 60 day follow-up written report.

The format of the items below is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, Reporting of Safeguards Events. Because this event does not involve a security system failure or a threat related incident, items 1 through 14 in section 3.2 of Regulatory Guide 5.62 are relevant to this issue and are addressed below:

1. DATE AND TIME OF THE EVENT The event occurred on August 14, 2015 at approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days 0.231 hours 0.00137 weeks 3.15815e-4 months EDT.

2. LOCATION OF ACTUAL OR THREATENED EVENT IN A PROTECTED AREA, MATERIAL ACCESS AREA, CONTROLLED ACCESS AREA, VITAL AREA, OR OTHER (SPECIFY AREA)

The event occurred in the SPS security vehicle sally port, which is the vehicle search area for entry into the PA.

NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

3. THE POWER REACTOR OPERATING PHASE, E.G., SHUT-DOWN, OPERATING At the time of this event, both SPS Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power.

4. SAFETY SYSTEMS AFFECTED OR THREATENED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY The event did not result in an introduction of contraband into the PA, and no safety systems were threatened.

5. TYPE OF SECURITY FORCE ON SITE (I.E., PROPRIETARY, CONTRACT)

SPS maintains a proprietary security force.

6.

NUMBER AND TYPE OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, E.G., EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS, SECURITY, VISITORS, NRC PERSONNEL, OTHER (SPECIFY)

The truck driver and one on-duty Dominion SPS Nuclear Security Officer performing the vehicle search were involved.

7.

METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF INCIDENT, E.G., ROUTINE INSPECTION, TEST, MAINTENANCE, ALARM, CHANCE, INFORMANT, COMMUNICATED THREAT, UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES (GIVE DETAILS)

Prior to being searched, the truck driver was instructed to leave his cell phone and backpack inside the sally port gate box. He then told the Nuclear Security Officer that there was a disassembled weapon inside his backpack with the rest of the weapon located inside the delivery truck.

8.

PROCEDURAL ERRORS INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE There were no procedural errors identified. The contraband action was a violation of SPS Security policy. The driver failed to comply with the postings at the security checkpoint and vehicle sally port that cautions personnel against bringing contraband onto company property.

9.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO EVENT A search of the backpack identified the weapon slide and one magazine containing (10) 45 caliber rounds wrapped inside a towel. The lower receiver and second magazine containing (10) 45 caliber rounds were located under clothing in the driver side of the truck's sleeping compartment. At 0850 hours0.00984 days 0.236 hours 0.00141 weeks 3.23425e-4 months on August 14, 2015, a one-hour notification was made to the NRC NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

pursuant to 10OCFR73, Appendix G, item 1(d), for an attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area.

10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED The truck driver was denied station protected area access and he and the vehicle were escorted off-site. The driver has also been denied future access to all Dominion nuclear sites.

11. LOCAL, STATE, OR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONTACTED No local or federal law enforcement agencies were contacted.

12. DESCRIPTION OF MEDIA INTEREST AND PRESS RELEASE No press release was made and no media interest was identified.

13. INDICATION OF PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS On May 21, 2010, an employee attempted to introduce a handgun and magazine loaded with six rounds of ammunition in his bag into the protected area, but was stopped by Nuclear Security Officers during the routine inspection process when the bag was processed through the x-ray machine in the security access control building, which is outside the protected area.

Security noted that the employee was cooperative when stopped and unaware that the contraband was in the bag.

14. KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACT Barry Garber, SPS Licensing, telephone 757-365-2725.