05000278/LER-2005-001, Regarding Loss of High Pressure Coolant Injection System Function as a Result of Inoperable Flow Controller
| ML051250397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2005 |
| From: | Grimes J Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML051250397 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2782005001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Exelkns.
Exelon Nuclear Telephone 717.456.7014 Nuclear Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station www.exeloncorp.com 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314-9032 10CFR 50.73 April 26,2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-278
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) 3-05-01 This LER reports a loss of safety function involving the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) resulting from an inoperability of the system flow controller. In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory
commitment
contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, Joseph P. Grimes Plant Manager Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station JPG/djf/CR 308116 Attachment cc:
PSE&G, Financial Controls and Co-owner Affairs R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania INPO Records Center S. J. Collins, US NRC, Administrator, Region I R. l. McLean, State of Maryland F. L. Bower, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector CCN 05-14036
- ~
I SUMMARY OF EXELON NUCLEAR COMMITMENTS The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon Nuclear.
(Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)
Commitment
Committed Date or "Outage" In accordance with NEI 99-04, the In accordance with the Corrective Action regulatory commitment contained in this Program correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER.
NRC FORMf366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06130/2007 (6-2O04)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the Information digits/characters for each block) collection.
- 3. PAGE Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) 05000 2781 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Loss of High Pressure Coolant Injection System Function as a Result of Inoperable Flow Controller
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEUNTA RVFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR S
EQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 03 2005 05
- - 01 0
04 26 2005 05000
- 9. OPE MATING MODE 11.THIS REPORTIS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OFIO CFR§: (Checkalithatapply) i O 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.731a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) l0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
O 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(C)(l)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(C)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4)
O 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) a 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER ol 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below or In (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Cause of the Event
Troubleshooting of the HPCI system determined that the HPCI system flow controller was inoperable and therefore, would not able to perform its HPCI flow control function. The preliminary failure analysis report has determined that the internal power supply (EIIS: JX) of the flow controller failed.
The flow controller is a Moore Controller, Model # 352EA21 NNF and had previously been used in a non-safety related application. The controller was removed from this application and was dedicated for safety related usage by a qualified vendor in December 2002. The flow controller was installed in the Unit 3 HPCI application in March 2004.
The cause investigation determined that the internal power supply was not replaced when the flow controller was dedicated in December 2002, resulting in exceeding the expected service life of the power supply. Additional underlying causes including the process for procurement / dedication of spare parts are being further evaluated in accordance with the Corrective Action Program requirements.
Corrective Actions
The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorilytested and returned to an operable status on 3/4/05 by 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />.
Additional corrective actions are being evaluated in accordance with the corrective action program including the need to ensure appropriate rebuilding of components sent to off-site vendors for dedication.
Other similar flow controllers (e.g. HPCI and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) on Units 2 and 3 were evaluated and determined to remain operable. Additional extent of condition evaluations concerning the dedication of used components are being performed in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.
Previous Similar Occurrences LER 3-04-01 reported a failure of the previously installed HPCI flow controller. This previous flow controller had been in service since 1994 and failed in March 2004. The cause of the previous flow controller event was due to an internal power supply failure as a result of exceeding its service life.
Corrective actions planned as part of LER 3-04-01 included updating the preventive maintenance template to specify a shorter periodicity for routine maintenance of flow controller internal power supplies. Although significant extent of condition corrective actions were taken as a result of the event reported in LER 3-04-01, the flow controller installed in March 2004 was not replaced since it was assumed that the controller had been refurbished when it was dedicated for safety related usage.