05000278/LER-2004-001, Re Loss of High Pressure Coolant Injection System Function as a Result of Inoperable Flow Controller
| ML041250031 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2004 |
| From: | Stone J Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NEI 99-04 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML041250031 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 2782004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Exelkn.
Exelon Nuclear Telephone 717.456.7014 N ucl e ar Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station www.exeloncorp.com 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314-9032 10CFR 50.73 April 30, 2004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-278
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) 3-04-01 This LER reports a loss of safety function involving the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) resulting from an inoperability of the system flow controller. In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory
commitment
contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely, John A. Stone t lant Manager (each Bottom Atomic Power Station JAS/djf/CR 209005 Attachment cc:
PSE&G, Financial Controls and Co-owner Affairs R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania INPO Records Center H. J. Miller, US NRC, Administrator, Region I R. l. McLean, State of Maryland C. W. Smith, US NRC, Senior Resident Inspector CCN 04-14045
SUMMARY OF EXELON NUCLEAR COMMITMENTS The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon Nuclear.
(Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)
Commitment
Committed Date or "Outage" In accordance with NEI 99-04, the In accordance with the Corrective Action regulatory commitment contained in this Program correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER.
Abstract
On 3/17/04, at approximately 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br />, during the performance of a routine surveillance test for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
- system, Operations personnel discovered that HPCI was inoperable. During performance of the surveillance test, the HPCI turbine could not achieve a speed above 1000 rpm and no significant discharge pressure was observed. Within two minutes of the initial turbine start, HPCI was tripped and the steam supply isolation valve was closed. The cause of the event is due to an inoperability of the HPCI system flow controller. The HPCI controller was discovered to not respond properly. The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status on 3/19/04 by 0145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br />. Other flow related components on the HPCI system were evaluated and found to be in an acceptable condition. Other similar flow controllers (HPCI and RCIC) on Units 2 and 3 were evaluated for extent of condition concerns and determined to be operable. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Cause of the Event
Troubleshooting of the HPCI system determined that the HPCI system flow controller was inoperable resulting in the HPCI turbine not achieving proper speed and therefore, not developing discharge pressure. The cause of the event is due to an inoperability of the HPCI system flow controller. The HPCI controller was discovered to not respond to faceplate manipulations. Flow controller output was measured and found to not meet specifications.
The flow controller (FC-3-23-108) was sent off-site for further analysis. It was determined that the power supply board within the controller had failed.
The flow controller is a Moore Controller, Model # 352EA21NNF and has been in service since 1994.
The Power Supply is a Micro 352, 120/240 Volt Plug-in Power Supply (part no. 1455-123).
Corrective Actions
The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status on 3/19/04 by 0145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br />.
Other flow related components on the HPCI system were evaluated and found to be in an acceptable condition.
Other similar flow controllers (HPCI and RCIC) on Units 2 and 3 were evaluated for extent of condition concerns and determined to be operable.
Additional corrective actions are being evaluated in accordance with the corrective action program including evaluating the appropriateness of the controller preventative maintenance frequency.
Previous Similar Occurrences There were no previous similar LERs identified involving a loss of HPCI safety function due to an inoperable flow controller.